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ABSTRACT
The author proposes to examine the ontological and epistemological foundations of
Martin Buber’s novel, For the Sake of Heaven, in this philosophical study. He
purposes to use what he finds to address questions regarding the ways that
educational communities often ignore the underlying ontological narratives that are
important to communities. After describing Martin Buber’s idea of dialogical
relations, the author explores dialogical relations as a current running through the
novel. Using the model of the epistemic commentary, he describes the Hasidic
community of the character known as the prophet in the novel. Themes of ontology
and epistemology are developed. The author then proceeds to consider some
possible applications of Buber’s ontology and epistemology that seem to ground the
prophet’s community. Here the author considers the roles of teacher and student
with ample characterization of the kinds of relations that might develop in
educational communities taking on the ontological and epistemological assumptions
of the prophet’s community. The author then brings to the discussion the critiques
of Buber’s work: Emmanuel Levinas’ critique of the Buberian idea of symmetry in
relationships, Karl Barth’s epistemological criticism of Buber’s novel, and some
logically fallacious arguments against Buber’s work in the novel. The author
concludes his philosophical research of Buber’s For the Sake of Heaven by paying
attention to his own developing relationship with the text. Recommendations
regarding future work, focusing on themes of the unintentional, on the development
of ontological and epistemological grounding in educational communities,
particularly in curriculum work, are made.
v
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CHAPTER I Considering Martin Buber
Introduction
This dissertation explores Martin Buber’s novel, For the Sake of Heaven. It
involves analysis of the text, interpretation of the analysis and subsequent
application of it in imagined educational communities. It also involves criticism of
the historical reliability of the text as well as criticism of its ontological and
epistemological claims, followed up by a consideration of its practicability and
applicability in educational communities. To get at the discussion of Buber’s novel,
some groundwork will be done in chapter one
First, I want to situate myself in relation to the dissertation. Second, I want to
explore the kinds of problems that have interested me and why I think Buber may
have something to offer in this context. Third, I will give some background on
Martin Buber. Fourth, I will explore one of his most well-known works, I and Thou,
using his own interpretation of it in Between Man and Man.1 Finally, I want to point
to his novel, For the Sake of Heaven, exploring the reasons I’ve chosen this text to
explore Martin Buber’s ontology and epistemology and its possible contributions.

Situating the Author
As a beginning teacher more than twenty years ago, the kinds of problems I
considered in education generally concerned my own preparedness in relation to
1

I will not spend time directly exploring Buber’s poetic masterpiece, I and Thou. Instead, I will use
Buber’s own interpretation of I and Thou, in Between Man and Man. The reason for this is that
the prose of Between Man and Man is much clearer and more concise than the poetry of I and
Thou. Buber has made the task of interpreting I and Thou simpler. His interpretation of his own
poetry should be considered authoritative. At least that is the assumption of this dissertation.
Nevertheless, I will make reference to perhaps his greatest of works, I and Thou, in the course of
this dissertation. But I will be interpreting it using his own words in Between Man and Man.
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school curriculum and subject area knowledge. I worked on the premise that
teacher readiness was the be all and end all of the successful classroom. If things in
my classrooms weren’t going well, I felt guilty, understanding that it must have been
that I simply hadn’t prepared well enough. School board initiatives pointing to the
need for better teacher preparedness only reinforced this feeling of guilt. The
solution seemed simple to me: I must work harder and do things better and faster.
Deeper philosophical issues didn’t seem to concern me much. More immediately
pressing issues like classroom management took the foreground, and philosophical
questions about problems in education just didn’t occupy me.
It is not that I didn’t have an interest in these philosophical questions. I most
certainly did, and that interest was fed by undergraduate work as a student in
philosophy and religion. Perhaps it was that I just never seemed to have the time to
think philosophically in contexts for which thinking would seem constructive and
not just an impediment to an effective classroom.2 Through the years I have noted
as well that elementary and secondary teachers I have known have not seemed for
the most part to be interested in pursuing philosophical problems in education.
There is little wonder that this is the case, given present political realities associated
with the status of educational foundations scholarship in higher education. In my
own graduate school, foundations of education coursework is gradually being
displaced by other, apparently more useful subjects. Teacher candidates are
typically not expected to pursue a significant amount of work in any of the three
core areas of social foundations of education: history, sociology and most

2

I will return to Buber’s critique of the idea of effectiveness in chapter two.

2

particularly, philosophy. Philosophy does indeed seem to have been given short
shrift. And that is the more to pity.

Why Martin Buber
To counter this seeming lack of interest in philosophy in schools, I have come
to think it would be appropriate to consider in a philosophical way the kinds of
issues that should concern educators and all other interested parties, including
academicians, students, parents and politicians. This approach wouldn’t limit itself
to merely pragmatic considerations like class sizes, budgets and resource materials.
Though it would not dismiss such concerns, it would focus on a much deeper level,
laying the ontological and epistemological foundations of education. I have come to
see this as the problem that plagues our educational communities. We don’t
generally require teachers and even school systems to detail their ontological and
epistemological assumptions. This has been relegated to academia. Sadly, even
there, philosophy of education coursework is not often required of students in
schools of education.
It was Nel Noddings’ work on care theory that turned my attention to Buber’s
work and to what it might say ontologically and epistemologically to me as an
educator.3 Buber’s emphasis on dialogical relations had interested me as a student
of religion, particularly as it applied to the reading of material like the Bible. I had
understood that reading itself was kind of conversation. I first read his I and Thou

3

Nel Noddings, Caring, a Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984).
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around 1979 as a sophomore in college.4 From that time to Nodding’s reminder of
his work, twenty-seven years had passed! A couple of academic degrees, about
twenty years teaching in public and private settings and the pursuit of a terminal
degree had made my approach to his works different, to say the least. What I bring
to the conversation now has been affected by those years in classrooms with
primary and secondary students, by all those meetings with colleagues, and by
continuing conversations in college and university settings as both student and
teacher. Perhaps it had already been affected by a serious interest in religious
studies that I began developing as an undergraduate student in physics and
chemistry. Maybe it was Buber’s writings that helped shift me from a concentration
in the natural sciences to their grounding in the humanities. Indeed it has been said
that the mother of science is philosophy.5 I cannot say for sure that Buber helped
me decide to leave the academic study of science for the humanities as a young man,
but such a thing would be appropriate, a fitting part of the narrative of a life coming
full circle. Perhaps it was the case that I was not yet ready for Buber’s ideas as a
young man not yet twenty. At least that many years would transpire before I would
pursue the opportunity to hear and respond to his words again.
I am convinced that a return to Buber’s philosophy of dialogue would have
something important to say to educators. There is something fundamentally wrong
in our educational communities. A read of Jonathan Kozol’s work gives some

4
5

Martin Buber and Walter Arnold Kaufmann, I and Thou (New York,: Scribner, 1970).
Walter Arnold Kaufmann, The Future of the Humanities (New York: Reader's Digest Press :
distributed by Crowell, 1977).
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indicators of this.6 It is shocking indeed that the very schools named after the most
well-known civil rights leaders are the ones where conditions are the bleakest.
Students do not feel a connection with the schools in which they are placed, often in
settings that are great distances from their own home communities. This is
mentioned by the feminist bell hooks, who speaks of her own experience as a child
having lost the sense of connection with her supportive neighborhood and the
relationships with caring teachers in the schools into which she was placed as a
consequence of desegregation.7 The conditions that often exist in our schools do
have something to do with the foundations that have been laid, foundations in our
particular communities that are ontological and epistemological. These ontological
foundations have to do with the narratives our communities hold to be important.
They belong to our communities and involve the assumptions that we make
concerning the meanings of what it is to be human beings, the meanings we give to
things of physical, social, psychological and spiritual significance. These
assumptions also have to do with our communities’ narratives concerning God, the
meaning and origin of all things, the fundamental assumptions about how deep
seated problems can or should be addressed and the purpose of existence. These
meanings are not derived through empirical investigation. They are assumed
regarding the way things are. This is what gives the meanings ontological status.
Just as bell hooks observes, when we are torn away from the narratives of
our own communities, we are consequently torn from the structures that support
6

Jonathan Kozol, The Shame of the Nation : The Restoration of Apartheid Schooling in America, 1st ed.
(New York: Crown Publishers, 2005).
7 bell hooks, Teaching to Transgress : Education as the Practice of Freedom (New York: Routledge,
1994).
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us. I believe this to be perhaps the fundamental issue which should concern our
educational communities. How can we bridge the gap between education as it is
made to appear in its present form, which pays close attention to specific outcomes
measured against specific, measurable performances, identified in stated
curriculum, and the apparent disconnect vis-à-vis stated curriculum and the
ontological and epistemological foundations of our students’ communities? In short,
how can we begin to pay attention to student and community narratives, using them
to inform our ways of teaching and learning?
Buber has something to say to this disconnect. As an existentialist, he brings
to the conversation a realism which is willing to pay attention to the idea of
suffering and the seeming absurdity of existence itself in light of it.8 And this
existentialist approach has the potential to inform a cultural studies concern with
issues of domination. Addressing issues of domination is possible by paying
attention to the idea of suffering. As an existentialist theologian, he brings a
narrative that is responsive to the assumptions of many communities that are
represented in our educational communities. As a philosopher of dialogue, he
brings a language that educators can access, since dialogical relations are
foundational concerns in educational communities. Attention to Buber’s work has
the promise of equipping educators and academicians with language to critique
structures that support our educational communities. Addressing deep level
concerns about the ways we relate to one another has the promise of fundamental,
epistemological change. Addressing concerns about deep level narratives has the

8

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Age of Reason (New York,: Vintage Books, 1973).
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promise of repositioning our educational communities relative our own ontological
narratives.

Background on Buber
Born in Vienna in 1878, Martin Buber was to develop wide ranging interests,
fueled by his experiences in Europe of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He
faced questions about life as a Jewish intellectual in Hitler’s Germany of the 1930s,
wrote extensively about Jewish life in Palestine, was directly involved in the
emergence of Israel and addressed a variety of issues in multiple disciplines. His
writings have inspired research in philosophy, sociology, education, religious
studies, history, and art history among other fields. His scholarly works include the
first modern editions of rabbinic midrash literature, and he wrote extensively on
Zionism and on Hasidic literature.9
Buber’s grandparents’ wealth, which was the effect of mining, banking and
trade, gave Martin financial security until 1939 when Hitler invaded Poland and his
grandfather’s estate was ransacked. Until that time, however, Buber was free to
pursue many interests, including the study of Hebrew, Yiddish, Polish, German,
Greek, Latin and French.10
Buber entered the University of Vienna in 1895. He studied philosophy and
the history of art there and at the Universities of Berlin, Zurich and Leipzig. He
received a Ph.D. from Vienna in 1904.11

9

Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber's Life and Work (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988).
Ibid.
11 Stuart C. Brown, Diané Collinson, and Robert Wilkinson, Biographical Dictionary of TwentiethCentury Philosophers, Routledge Reference (London ; New York: Routledge, 1996), 111.
10
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From 1900-1901 , Buber began to come under the influence of Gustav
Landauer, an anarchist who criticized Buber for his views on the German role in
World War I. He was to become one of his closest friends. Later, Buber took up a
Jewish religious studies lectureship at Frankfurt University and worked there until
he immigrated to Palestine in 1937, where he taught social philosophy at the
Hebrew University in Jerusalem until 1951. Until his death fourteen years later,
Buber drew frequent visitors to his home, exploring issues in social philosophy. He
visited the United States in 1951, giving lectures which eventually were published as
“Eclipse of God”12 and “At the Turning.”13 Union Theological Seminary gave Buber
the Universal Brotherhood award in 1951. Hebrew Union College in Cincinatti, Ohio,
gave him an honorary Doctor of Letters degree that same year. Buber received the
Erasmus Award in 1963 at the age of 85.14
At Buber’s death, his bibliography had grown to upwards of 700
publications.15 Needless to say, launching into Buber’s works would take one across
many fields. Many students of Buber, however, have gravitated towards perhaps his
most famous text, I and Thou. It provides an insight into his ontology and
epistemology, focusing as it does on questions regarding the possibilities of dialogue.

12

Martin Buber, Eclipse of God; Studies in the Relation between Religion and Philosophy, 1st ed. (New
York,: Harper, 1952).
13 At the Turning; Three Addresses on Judaism (New York,: Farrar, 1952).
14 Kenneth Kramer and Mechthild Gawlick, Martin Buber's I and Thou : Practicing Living Dialogue
(New York: Paulist Press, 2003).
15 cf. http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0208.html (accessed May, 2012)
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Between Man and Man
Between Man and Man was Buber’s interpretation of I and Thou.16 It is here
that Buber attempts to extend and apply what was said in his pivotal treatment on
dialogical relations published in 1923, I and Thou. It seems appropriate that I pay
attention to Buber's own explanations of his writing, since it is my goal to address
his ideas on dialogue. I hope to do this by describing as carefully as possible some of
Buber's work here, adopting his language in the process. This will involve as well
exploring the possible implications of his ideas from various perspectives,
considering in what ways his ideas taken seriously might impact educational praxis
in particular. Finally, I want to consider some potential problems with his ideas.
In keeping with my intent to follow Buber's lead, let me begin by outlining
some of the elements in his own rich description and application of his ideas about
dialogue.17 First, Buber feels the need to illustrate and apply the dialogical principle
introduced in I and Thou. Buber’s dialogical principle involved the description of
two ways of relating to others. First Buber speaks of the “I-it” way of relating to
others. This is the way of objectifying others. Second Buber speaks of the “I-Thou”
way of relating to others. This is the non-objective way of relating to others. Buber
further explores the dialogical principle in “Dialogue”, an essay published in 1923. I
will begin with a description of Buber's philosophy of dialogue.

16
17

Martin Buber, Between Man and Man (London,: K. Paul, 1947).
I have chosen to use the bracketed expressions [man or woman] or [people] where Buber's
customary usage is “man”, except when the context needs to be gendered or won't be rendered
apparently sexist by its use, as well as in the case of titles given to his works. This is an attempt
to adopt more inclusive language. I do not think this will damage the work. Where it might, I will
try to make note of that.

9

Beyond Speech
Beginning with the description of a recurring dream in which he says he
hears a cry for help, Buber demonstrates that communication does not always
involve conversation:
Just as the most eager speaking at one another does not make a
conversation (this is most clearly shown in that curious sport, aptly
termed discussion, that is, 'breaking apart', which is indulged in by
[people] who are to some extent gifted with the ability to think), so for
a conversation no sound is necessary, not even a gesture.18
Buber further offers a couple of non-examples to clarify, first, the sharing of
a lovers’ gaze, the second the mystics' way of seeking a relationship with the divine.
Buber points out that both of these involve gestures that are physical. Against these
he offers the example of two people sitting on a bench, having met earlier and
spoken, just sitting silently. One of them is ready to receive things from the other
and the other is closed off. Buber calls attention to the possibility of a moment in
time when the person less receptive might find himself or herself open so that he or
she is ready to receive. Even though nothing is heard from or said by the other
person, still the individual is ready. Buber offers this moment as an example of the
kind of dialogical relationship to which he is pointing. Though he recognizes the
importance of sound and gesture in dialogue, Buber suggests that dialogue is not
dependent on them, since dialogue does not have to be objectively comprehensible,
though it is indeed something that happens in the context of real, concrete human
experience.19

18Buber,
19Ibid.,

Between Man and Man, 3.
4.
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Beyond the Erotic
To further delineate his idea of dialogue, Buber explores what it could mean
in terms of the erotic in order to eliminate it as an aspect of the idea.20 He speaks of
the erotic as “a co-mingling and opposition of monologue and dialogue,” suggesting
that the ecstasies of lovers are sometimes the ways a lover would delight in his or
her own experience (and not in the other person’s). He avoids a description of
dialogue in terms of the erotic, and points instead to the kinds of unpretentious
glances that strangers might exchange, revealing a dialogical nature. Buber says that
dialogue has an effect on people, producing change from “communication to
communion” and gives an example from his own life of an apparently irreconcilable
argument with someone. Buber discovers suddenly in himself the willingness to
accept his opponent’s point of view and just let the opposition go, choosing to end it
with an embrace.21
Beyond Ideological Impasse
Against the objection that worldviews that are deep level must be exposed
openly, making both parties vulnerable, so that people can meet each other
conditionally, Buber suggests that his view includes this vulnerability, but goes
further in offering dialogue as a way to overcome this, not simply through a
worldview alone. People in dialogue don't have to “give up their point[s] of view”,
but just “let themselves run free of [them] for an immortal moment.”22 Against a

20

Paul Arthur Schilpp, Martin Buber, and Maurice S. Friedman, The Philosophy of Martin Buber, [1st
ed. (La Salle, Ill.,: Open Court, 1967), 130.
21 Martin Buber and Ronald Gregor Smith, Between Man and Man (New York,: Macmillan, 1965), 6.
22 Ibid.
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second objection that people can't let go of points of view that are matters of deeply
held confessions of faith, that doubters must be converted or instructed, Buber
points to another view of faith that sacred ideas are clarified when people turn to
one another in particular contexts. Buber is opening up a space here for religious
conversation involving certainties but also involving genuine openness to the
possibilities of others. He reminds us that even if speech and communication fail,
what remains in dialogue is the “mutuality of the inner action, the action of turning
to one another.”23
Three Ways of Receiving Others
Buber considers three ways that people turn to or perceive one another, in
order to situate his conception of dialogue in one of the three ways. Things that are
perceived do not necessarily know that they are being perceived. Furthermore, it is
irrelevant whether the thing perceived stands in relation to or has a standpoint
towards the perceiver.
The first way of receiving an other involves what Buber identifies as
observing. This involves an intentional fixing of a person in the mind. The
perception here involves probing, writing up traits, and lying in wait. This would
involve scientific investigation.
The second way of perceiving, onlooking, involves unintentional waiting to
see freely, letting go of the need to take note of everything, even allowing forgetting.
The onlooker is looking for neither character nor expression. Buber describes this
as the way of the artist. Like the observer, the onlooker is oriented towards the
23

Ibid., 7.
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other person by his or her desire to perceive either traits (as for the observer) or
existence (as for the onlooker). For both, the object of perception is separated from
them. It is not involved personally with them. And it makes no demands on their
lives. As Buber says, “the whole is given over to the aloof fields of aesthesis.”24 This
is turning as an aesthetic.
The third and final way of perceiving for Buber, acceptance, occurs in the
“receptive hour” of personal life, when a person meets another in such a way that he
or she has no objective grasp at all of the other. Still, there is the perception that
something is said. It has nothing to do with the discernment of what kind of person
is encountered, or what is going on in him or her. This way of receiving says nothing
objective about the person being encountered. And yet, something is said that says
something to the receiver. Something is spoken that is accepted. It might be that
the receiver is being called to help this individual, or to hear something about
himself or herself. The individual encountered really has no discernible relation
with the receiver, since, as Buber observes, “It is not he [or she] who says it to me, as
that solitary [person] silently confessed his [or her] secret to his neighbor on the
seat; but it says it.”25
This thing being said in this third way of receiving cannot be objectively
explained, since the person who is saying it to the other person is not the object of
the perceiver. He or she is merely the one for whom the perceiver may have to do
something or else from whom he or she might be called to learn something. The
perception here is simply acceptance. Buber says this involves becoming aware, and
24
25

Ibid., 9.
Ibid.
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points out this may be of people, of animals, or even of plants or stones. Dialogue is
only limited for Buber by the willingness to be aware.26
Signs of Address
As the perceiver becomes aware, he or she is awakened to particular signs of
address. These signs are part of life since living itself means that one is being
addressed. All that is needed is to present oneself and to perceive.
However, Buber believes that humans have a built in mechanism to ward off
the signs people give. These signs, “soundless thunderings” seem to “threaten us
with annihilation”, so we “perfect the defense apparatus”, assuring ourselves that
we are not being addressed, that all of those signs are for the world and not for us,
that nothing is being required at all.27 This is the way Buber says we turn off the
power to receive from others.
Furthermore, by making the things that happen to us lifeless and sterile,
removing the signs of address from them, we remove what is happening in the
world which does not seem to directly refer to us. Ironically, speech itself becomes
the way that we distance ourselves from this address, “addressing itself in
speechifying ways regarding things with which we have nothing to do.”28
Buber answers some objections concerning these signs. First he considers
the criticism that they might appear to be superstitious. He defends against this by
pointing out that foretelling things depends upon laws that are known and

26

Ibid., 10.
Ibid., 11.
28 Robert E. Wood, Martin Buber's Ontology; an Analysis of I and Thou, Northwestern University
Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy (Evanston,: Northwestern University Press,
1969), 85.
27
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repeatable, as well as upon rules that fortunetellers find in dictionaries. He says
that this is a type of false knowledge and not even real faith, which begins “when the
dictionary is put down.”29
Buber says that signs of address appear in the things that occur to us and that
this cannot be interpreted using some pre-formulated information; it is unique; it
can't be remembered independently; it belongs only to the moment of address.
Further, Buber explains using a metaphor of a stream and bridge:
Faith stands in the stream of 'happening but once’ which is
spanned by knowledge. All the emergency structures of analogy
and typology are indispensable for the work of the human spirit,
but to step on them when the question of the questioner steps up
to you, to me, would be running away. Lived life is tested and
fulfilled in the stream alone. 30
Summarizing what he has observed regarding this third way of perceiving,
Buber puts it eloquently:
With all deference to the world continuum of space and time I know as
a living truth only concrete world reality which is constantly, in every
moment, reached out to me. I can separate it into its component parts,
I can compare them and distribute them into groups of similar
phenomena, I can derive them from earlier and reduce them to
simpler phenomena; and when I have done all this I have not touched
my concrete world reality. Inseparable, incomparable, irreducible,
now, happening once only, it gazes upon me with a horrifying look.31
Beyond Mysticism
Buber does not want his idea of dialogue to be criticized as mystical. He
recalls an event in which he failed to hear what was being said to him when a young
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man came with questions. Recalling at that time his conception of the religious as a
sort of “getting away from the everyday into the mystical experience of ecstasy”, he
saw how his response to the man had not actually involved listening at all. Buber
says of himself that he really had not been there with the man “in the spirit.”32 It
was this experience that soured Buber with religion as a disconnected, mystical
experience distanced from real life, as he says in the following passage :
Since then I have given up the 'religious' which is nothing but the
exception, extraction, exaltation, ecstasy; or it has given me up. I
possess nothing but the everyday out of which I am never taken. The
mystery is no longer disclosed, it has escaped or it has made its
dwelling here where everything happens as it happens. I know no
fullness but each mortal hour's fullness of claim and responsibility.
Though far from being equal to it, yet I know that in the claim I am
claimed and may respond in responsibility, and know who speaks and
demands a response.33

The religious is not the exception for Buber; it is everything. It is “the living
possibility of dialogue.”34 Prayer refers itself to real life and does not take one away
from its real context. People are “called upon from above, required, chosen,
empowered, [and] sent” and so are addressed in their everyday lives, in their
“mortal bit of life”; the religious individual for Buber is not “swallowed up in a
fullness without obligation” but rather “willed for the life of communion.”35
Buber says that it is God Who addresses us as we encounter others in
dialogue in particular moments of life . He likens this to our understanding of
authorship as we read poetry. When we really understand a poem, we may not
32
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know anything about its author, but with time and the reading of other poems
written by the same author, we form a kind of “polyphony of the person's existence,
as the subjects of the poems combine in various ways, completing and confirming
one another.”36 In such a way, “out of the givers of the signs, the speakers of words
in lived life, there arises for us with a single identity, ‘the Lord of the voice, the
One’…God’s hearing has been sunk down in the deafness of mortals where the
voices of the creatures grope past one another, and in their very missing of one
another succeed in reaching the eternal partner.”37
Beyond Morality
Classical philosophical ethics does not point to human responsibility for
Buber. The idea as “an 'ought' that swings free in the air” has to become connected
to life as it is lived; “genuine responsibility exists only where there is real
responding.”38 This response involves being attentive to what is really happening in
the world, required to read the signs that are given. This involves swimming
upstream, “going against the current of world civilization which seeks to inoculate
us against the consequences of attentiveness.”39 We would not be able to take
control of situations and could not rely on knowledge, techniques, systems or
programs. We would not be able to distance ourselves from things by classifying
them; we would have to receive from them. We would have to respond to the voice
that is directed towards us out of everyday life not by being silent or by doing things
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as usual. We would have to enter into situations that face us. This would make
these situations real and part of real life.
Buber gives examples to clarify the kind of response he is pointing to: “A dog
has looked at you, you answer for its glance, a child has clutched your hand, you
answer for its touch, a host of men moves about you, you answer for their need.”40
The response here for Buber is not moral, for morality is detached philosophical
reasoning which does not respond to anything. It is an idea whereas religious
response is a phenomenon. Buber puts it this way, “The reality of morality, the
demand of the demander, has a place in religion, but the reality of religion, the
unconditioned being of the demander, has no place in morality.”41 Buber concludes
his first section describing dialogue with some final remarks regarding dialogue as
religious:
Religion as risk, which is ready to give itself up, is the nourishing
stream of the arteries; as system, possessing, assured and assuring,
religion which believes in religion is the veins' blood which ceases to
circulate. And if there is nothing that can so hide the face of our
fellow-man as morality can, religion can hide from us as nothing else
can the face of God. Principle there, dogma here, I appreciate the
'objective' compactness of dogma, but behind both there lies in wait
the – profane or holy – war against the situation's power of dialogue,
there lies in wait the 'once-for-all' which resists the unforeseeable
moment. Dogma, even when its claim of origin remains uncontested,
has become the most exalted form of invulnerability against
revelation. Revelation will tolerate no perfect tense, but man with the
arts of his craze for security props it up to perfectedness.42
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Buber speaks of dialogue of three types, two of which are only apparently
dialogue.43 The three types include genuine dialogue, already described above,
technical dialogue which seeks objective understanding, and monologue, which
pretends to be dialogue. The first kind, genuine dialogue, is rare, the second
common in modern times and the third represents “an underworld of faceless
specters of dialogue.”44
“Monologue” as Dialogue
The third type of dialogue, “monologue masquerading as dialogue” has to do
with speech which pays no attention to the listener.45 Such people in this kind of
apparent dialogue have no desire to communicate or to learn. They are not
interested in influence or in developing a relationship. The goal appears to be to
impress. This kind of “dialogue” is further represented in “friendly chat in which
each regards himself as absolute and in lovers' talk in which both partners alike
enjoy their own glorious soul and their precious experience.”46 This sort of
monologue cannot make an individual aware of the other. Even in deep intimacy,
monologue can never get beyond the self.
Buber is not constructing a moralist egoism/altruism dichotomy in his
description of dialogue. He speaks of people who have no personal relation with
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anyone except their enemies, but relate with them in such a way that “it is the
enemies' fault if the relation does not flourish into dialogue.”47
Buber does not identify dialogue with love. No one can love every man he
meets, says Buber, but love without dialogue, without reaching to the other, and
companying with the other, love remaining unto itself, Buber identifies as demonic.
The person who is unable or unwilling to enter into direct relation with each one
who meets him is empty and useless. On the other hand, that one who can be
“unreserved with each passer-by”, entering into “the companionship of creation”, is
“bound up in relation to the same center.”48
To further clarify what dialogue is not, Buber points to what he calls
“monologue's basic movement”, not turning away from an other, but rather a kind of
reflection.49 He does not mean egoism or egotism by this but refers to a person
failing to accept another person in his or her particularity. This is without reference
to the self, even though it touches and moves the individual. This kind of movement
lets the other exist only as one’s experience, as part of the self. Buber realizes what
this basic attitude of monologue does when he says that this kind of dialogue
“becomes a fiction” which reduces dialogue to a game, a kind of disintegration of
reality.50 The problem of retreating into singleness (being un-confronted) is that “it
is not in reality primal Being but only one being, one soul confronting all our
souls.”51 The person who is seeking ecstasy or some other retreat from real meeting
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with others is not made closer to “the God who is hidden above I and Thou, and he is
farther from the God who is turned to [people] and who is given as the I to a Thou
and the Thou to an I.”52 Buber does not want dialogue to be misunderstood as a
kind of absorption into otherness. The unity Buber points to is a “unity of life” as it
is lived in moments of concreteness in which “the word is heard and a stammering
answer dared.”53
Concerning classical philosophy's approach to thinking as the site where
“pure subject separates itself from the concrete person in order to establish and
stabilize a world for itself – a citadel which rises towering over the life of dialogue,
inaccessible to it, in which man-with-himself, the single one, suffers and triumphs in
glorious solitude”, Plato's “voiceless colloquy of the soul with itself”, Buber is
doubtful.54 Plato's monologue, as Buber sees it, points to the spirit an individual is
intended to become, “the image-self.” to which thought is taken for approval, that is,
for taking up into its own thinking.55 This does not represent dialogue for Buber.
Thought as Dialogue
Buber further draws on Ludwig Feuerbach who points beyond this imageself to “true dialectic…not a monologue of the solitary thinker with himself [but] a
dialogue between I and a Thou” , between real persons and not just between
idealized notions of persons.56 This is not just reflecting for Buber but refers to the
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seat of thought itself as “a relation to a genuine, not merely inward, Thou.”57
Thinking is not a game in a castle in the air. It concerns the business of life in which
one is aware of the “otherness of the other” without contesting it, taking its nature
into his own, thinking in relation to it, addressing it in thought.58 The thinker is not
in his or her thinking just relating to the other one for thinking alone. He or she is
oriented towards the other, and thinking itself belongs to the other just as much as it
does to the individual. Buber calls here for a time when “the action of thinking
endure[s], include[s] and refer[s] to the presence of the living [person] facing
us...when...the dialectic of thought become[s] dialogic, an unsentimental, unrelaxed
dialogue in the strict terms of thought with the [person] present at the moment.”59
Eros as Dialogue
Buber further defines what he means by dialogue. He recognizes that there
are different kinds of love and he mentions two, the Eros of dialogue and the Eros of
monologue.
Two people who experience dialogue as Eros love one another and receive
the shared love from the other's side as well, from both sides, and thus “for the first
time understand in a bodily way what an event is.”60
The Eros of monologue is manifest in many ways in the lives of selfdescribed, “eroticized men and women”, “in love with passion,” displaying “feelings
like medals”, interested in the effect he or she has on others, “rapturously attentive
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to his [or her] own surrender,” “collecting excitement,” “displaying power”,
“preening” himself or herself, “coveting to be himself [or herself] and yet to be
idolized”, “proud of good fortune”, and “experimenting.”61
Warnings
Buber warns also of “Leviathan monologists, who stipulate to the objects
they intend to devour that their suffering is a sacred duty.”62 He says these leaders
confuse and disintegrate growing people, so that they can no longer be influenced
for good. They cherish this power of influence, deceiving themselves and their
followers into believing that they are molders of youth.
Buber says these monologists are vain. Only the person who himself or
herself turns to the other human being and opens up to him or her receives the
world in him or her. “Only when two say to one another with all that they are, ‘It is
Thou’, is the indwelling of the Present Being between them.”63
Buber challenges the collectivist view of community as a conforming to
political goals. Comradeship is valued in the collectivity because it “strengthens the
band's reliable assault power.”64 Obedience is demanded and drills take the place of
open encounters between people. Real turning of person to person may be
discouraged since it might not support the goals of the group. Buber refers as well
to ideas about sacrifice of being and of self-realization as nonsensical. Renouncing
happiness, possessions, power and authority may be necessary, but the renunciation
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of being is for Buber simply absurd. Against this Buber proposes true, growing
community, a multitude of persons being with one another, moving towards one
goal but turning to one another dynamically. “Collectivity is based on an organized
atrophy of personal existence,” while “community [is based on] its increase and
confirmation in life lived towards one another.”65
Buber calls the world of the collectivity, generally, a world of pseudoobjectivism, since the collective for Buber is a “worldless faction”, in which both
“dialogue and monologue are silenced”, “[people marching] without Thou and
without I, those of the left who want to abolish memory, and those of the right who
want to regulate it; hostile and separated hosts, they march into the common
abyss.”66

For the Sake of Heaven
There is another text which Buber felt he could have only written towards
the end of his career, a distillation of his thought across several fields, his 1945
novel, For the Sake of Heaven.67 As with Camus’ and Sartre’s monumental works,
the text appears in narrative form. It is a story of life in a Polish Hassidic community
of late 18th to early 19th century Poland. Buber pours into the story of the lives of
two Hassidic rabbis his own ontology and epistemology. By juxtaposing the lives of
two very different men, Buber teases out a philosophy of being and knowing which
appears in fragments all across his work, brought to living example in novel form.
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I intend to analyze the character of the rabbinic figure referred to in the
novel as “the prophet”. I will also look at the ways that the character known as “the
Seer”, his community and the prophet’s community are used in the novel to lay out
Buber’s ontological and epistemological assumptions. The two rabbinic characters
represent for Buber, I believe, two approaches to questions of being (ontology) and
to ways of knowing (epistemology). The narrative surrounding the prophet
represents Buber’s own ontology and epistemology based on the idea of turning to
others. The other character represents objectivism, the assumption that knowledge
is objective and knowable apart from relationships. In the life of the prophet, he
shows what could be called a “prophetic approach to education”. This represents
applications of Buber’s thoughts on what is after him among feminists referred to as
“relational epistemology.”68
Contrasting this prophetic approach concerning itself with knowledge that
arises in the context of relationships, Buber develops the character of the “Seer”, a
Hasidic Rabbi who represents an approach to education which might be referred to
as “apocalyptic”. This represents objective knowing and top-down kinds of
approaches to education. Its focus is on “visioneering”, as it were, on gazing into the
future of education systems, ignoring the specific details involved in the
development of intimate relationships among the significant players in education.
Such an approach might be characterized as “vision-erring.”
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Conclusion
I set out in this chapter to explore some of the reasons that I have turned to
Martin Buber’s work, to situate myself in relation to the dissertation, to explore
Buber’s background, to delve into his basic ideas about dialogical relations in I and
Thou, using his text, Between Man and Man to interpret it, and finally to lay out my
intentions in relation to his novel, For the Sake of Heaven.
I have attempted to give voice to Buber's concept of dialogue. The task which
has sought to describe his philosophy of dialogue has gleaned the surface of his
extensive writing. It is perhaps one of the most difficult tasks of philosophy merely
to define the terms in its use, since philosophy has no specialized but only common
language.
My approach in the sections following chapter one of the dissertation is
informed by the idea of epistemic commentary, as it has been passed down to me in
my own work as a graduate student of Dr. Barbara Thayer-Bacon. Passed to her
from George Maccia, it is essentially a template for academic, philosophical
writing.69 The first task, which I will pursue in chapter two, is to describe what the
author/scholar is saying in the work. This will mean for me extensive analysis of
the text using a spreadsheet program. Appropriate fields will be created reflecting
essential categories, including sayings and behaviors of the two main characters in
the novel and their disciples. My attempt here is to faithfully represent what Buber
is saying in the text by sticking as closely as possible to his characterizations and to
his plot development. I will use the spreadsheet categories to tease out opposing
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ontological and epistemological themes developed in the novel, paying particular
attention to the ontological and epistemological disposition of the character known
as “the prophet.”
After I have laid out the ontological and epistemological themes developed in
chapter two, I want to “play the believing game”, as per practice in an epistemic
commentary.70 Here I will consider the implications of Buber’s ontology and
epistemology as it is developed in the second chapter. This will be where I consider
the effects that Buber’s central ontological and epistemological ideas would have on
our schools and in related academic environments, were they to be seriously
considered.
Once I have considered the effects of a serious adoption of Buber’s ideas, I
would like to bring in other voices to problematize the claims. First, I want to bring
in the voices of scholars of historical fiction, in order to critique Buber’s narrative as
a form in itself. I also want to consider the criticisms of Karl Barth and Emmanuel
Levinas concerning Buber’s ontology and epistemology. Finally, I will bring to fore
the criticisms of a number of scholars interested in the development of curriculum
in education. These curriculum scholars will be used to critique Buber’s ideas about
unplanned curriculum, a surprising effect of his ontology and epistemology.
It is my intent in chapter five to draw conclusions regarding Buber’s ontology
and epistemology as it is manifest in For the Sake of Heaven. I want to consider a
way forward, beyond the problems I was drawn to consider in chapter one.
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CHAPTER II For the Sake of Heaven
Introduction
As I indicated in chapter one, it is my intent now to move to a full description
of Buber’s monumental work, For the Sake of Heaven, to get at a possibly denser
description of his philosophy of dialogue. I hope to tease out themes of dialogue he
explores by offering a rich description of the main character in his novel known as
“the prophet.” I hope to retell Martin Buber’s story of the lives of two 18th century
rabbis through a retelling of the life and ideas of his major character. I will consider
the novel’s setting, laying out some “facts” of historical context first. Then I will
consider the ontological and epistemological details of the prophet’s life and ideas,
detailing the assumptions he makes regarding being and knowledge.71

Historical Context
First, to set the stage, let us consider the known historical context of the
novel. I limit this work to only the historic setting specifically mentioned in the text
and therefore essential to it. Buber’s setting was Poland of the mid-18th to the early
19th centuries, centered mainly in a particular Hasidic sect of the Jewish
communities of Lublin and Pshysha. The story follows on the heels of the rise of
Hasidism, a movement started by Rabbi Yisrael ben Eliezer, a man also known as the
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Baal Shem Tov. It is within this movement that the major events of the narrative
occur.
The first mention within the novel of its historical setting involves the
collapse of the Polish rebellion, which sought to throw off the Russian occupation,
and the subsequent evacuation of Warsaw and Vilna by the Russians in 1794.72
“Almost the entire Jewish legion fell in the defense of Warsaw. The suburb of Praga
went up in flames and Poles and Jews were being massacred,” recounts Buber.73

Historical Characters
Buber draws on known figures of history to populate his narrative, including
the disciples of the Baal Shem Tov. Both the Seer as well as the prophet are
fictionalized versions of actual persons belonging to Polish history, both of whom
came under the influence of the founder of Hasidism, the Baal Shem Tov.
Buber’s novel explores the contrasting lives and thinking of the two main
characters, the Seer and the prophet. Both were Hasidic rabbis known to history
and both have the same given name, Jacob Yitzchak. The Hasidic rabbi of Lublin,
Poland was Jacob Yitzchak, known in the novel as the Seer. The Hasidic rabbi of
Pshysha, PoIand was also Jacob Yitzchak. I will refer to Buber’s main character as
“the prophet” throughout the dissertation.
There are other persons Buber draws from history in the novel, including
other rabbis from the same era and similarly influenced, among whom is the Rabbi
of Kosnitz, also known as “the Maggid” or “the Maggid of Kosnitz”. The Maggid was
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born in 1740 in Kosnitz, Poland, Buber uses other known historic characters
including Napoleon Bonaparte, the Polish Prince Adam Czartoryski, the Polish
Prince Josef Czartoryski and Czar Alexander of Russia, among others. I will refer to
the characters that Buber uses to point to his ontology and epistemology, by
example or by contrast.
It is not my task to consider all of the characters of history upon whom Buber
draws in the novel. I will address this issue in chapter five of the dissertation.

Buber’s Narrative
Set within the larger context of certain events in Europe during the
Napoleonic wars, For the Sake of Heaven is historical fiction of the type of Camus’
and Sartre’s existential works, The Plague74 and The Age of Reason.75 Buber brings
to known history his own narrative, allowing it to be the vehicle of his own
ontological and epistemological truths. The ideas and responses of the Seer and the
prophet to what is happening at the time become Buber’s way of exploring two
possible ways that people understand and interact with the events of their lives and
with other things and people they encounter in these settings. However, the
character of the prophet is developed to embody Buber’s ontological and
epistemological ideas.
Political Events
At the time of the massacre in Praga, Buber has sixty disciples of the Seer
gathering in Lublin, Poland, pitting the activities and thinking of the Seer in support
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of the actions of Napoleon Bonaparte. This is significant, for it establishes the Seer’s
role and thinking in relation to what is happening in the world at large. After
establishing this connection, Buber retraces other connections of other characters in
the novel with significant historic figures. Buber places the Maggid in a meeting
with a member of the Polish royal family in 1787. The seventeen year old Prince
Adam Czartoryski “disguised himself as a peasant to seek out a wonder working
Rabbi.”76 Though the Prince was pretending to be concerned about relationship
problems, the Maggid is said to have known his true identity immediately and to
have seen through his attempt to hide his real purpose to get guidance regarding the
relationship of Napoleon and the Russian Czar.
This meeting with the Czar is important because it sets up in the novel a type
of relationship with political forces which is later to be juxtaposed over against
another kind of relation to political forces. The Maggid advises the prince that a
man was going to come who desired to rule over the whole world and that he
shouldn’t put his trust in that man. This establishes the relationship of the Maggid
of Kosnitz and Napoleon in the novel. It is not one of trust.
Buber uses another bit of history, setting another meeting of the Maggid with
the Prince when Czar Alexander visited the Polish royal family in 1805 in Pulavy,
Poland, ultimately swindling them, resulting in the confiscation of their estate and
the subjugation of the Polish monarchy. The Maggid forewarns the prince that the
Russians and the Prussians, as well as Napoleon, want Poland. Upon the Russian
occupation of Poland, Buber places Emperor Napoleon in Lublin in a chance meeting

76

Buber, For the Sake of Heaven, 196.

31

with the Seer’s own son, Zvi, a member of the Austrian army. Signifying the
importance of the Seer at the time, Napoleon is said to have relayed to the Rabbi’s
son the message to the Seer that he “was not afraid” of him.77 Napoleon has his first
defeat on an island along the Danube a week later. Of such was the influence of the
Seer. But it will not be until later in the story that the exact nature of the
relationship of the Seer with Napoleon is established.
Contrasting the opinion of the Seer, the Maggid does not have a positive view
of the role of Napoleon. On the eve of Purim, 1812, as Napoleon is dividing his army
for the invasion of Russia, Buber places the Polish Prince Josef Czartoryski in a
meeting with the Maggid. There the Maggid forewarns the Prince of Napoleon’s
coming defeat and of his own (the Prince’s) death. Exercising a gift of prophecy, the
rabbi utters “Napol Tipol”, “Falling thou wilt fall” from the story of Esther78, and
takes it to mean via the pun, “Napoleon, thou wilt fall.”79 The Maggid is elsewhere
recorded as declaring, "I am a man of war. I guard here in my bed the five pebbles
which the young David took from the brook for his sling when he went forth against
Goliath, the Philistine."80 The Rabbi is speaking here against Napoleon. The latter
events of the novel coincide roughly with peace negotiations between Napoleon and
the Czar of Russia in 1807 and conclude with the times of his exile to Elba.
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The Prophet’s Ontology
Since the major part of the novel is devoted to developing the prophet’s way
of interacting with things and people, let us consider some things the prophet did
and said in the novel. It is the prophet’s approach to things and people that deeply
reflects Buber’s own epistemological and ontological assumptions. The role of the
Seer in the novel is used by Buber as a foil, providing in its contrast a justification of
the way that Buber imagines the world of things and people ought to be. It is in the
character of the prophet that Buber points to the way of dialogue in true
communities, which he addresses in his interpretation of I and Thou in Between
Man and Man, a subject that I addressed in chapter one.
As I consider the role of the prophet in the novel, I would like to address
some ontological assumptions the prophet makes, as well as some epistemological
concerns the prophet has. First the prophet’s ontological assumptions need to be
considered, since these form the basis of his epistemology.
“"He told stories and I listened to him. He mingled truth with untruth. I
marked and remembered the truth. And thus I became a Hasid."81 Thus speaks one
of the prophet’s disciples of a rabbi from his youth, beautifully depicting the way
that “truth” emerges from communities and is discoverable in a mingling of
narratives, some of which may be “true” and some of which may be “untrue”. At
bottom, the determination of what is “true” is primarily an ontological question,
only secondarily an epistemological one. It is entirely an assumption. To illustrate,
the postulates of mathematics are entirely unproven assumptions. They form the
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basis of mathematics, its philosophical foundation without which it can make only
“common sense”. So it is with ontologies. They form the basis of all that we
understand regarding our communities and indeed of our world. They are hidden in
every idea we embrace. They are the underpinnings of the ways we approach
others and the basis upon which we build our communities. And so I turn to some
of the prophet’s ontological assumptions.
The Existence of God
First of all, the prophet has a deep interest in the idea of God, and more
deeply, in the assumption of the existence of God. The prophet’s concern with God
seems to emerge in the context of conversations involving dialogue. The idea of God
is applied in communal contexts. The prophet challenges the Seer on the assumed
difference in “the miraculous” and “the natural”. As the prophet says,
This distinction does not actually exist. I am unwilling to believe that
God confuses our poor understanding with artifices which contradict
the course of nature. It seems to me rather that when we say 'nature',
we mean the aspect of creation of all that takes place; when we say'
miracle' we mean the aspect of revelation. On the one hand we mean
what is called God's creative hand; on the other hand we mean His
pointing finger. The happening, though seen under the two aspects, is
the same. The true distinction seems to me to lie in the fact that we
often have a deeper awareness of the finger than of the hand.
'Miracle' means our receptivity to the eternal revelation. As for
'nature', since it is God's, who would presume to draw its
boundaries?82
So it is to be understood that the prophet sees no difference between what is
“miraculous” and what is “natural”. This is a good assumption, given the assumption
of God. Assumptions are altogether the concern when we are speaking of ontology.
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Furthermore, this lends itself to an assumption concerning the relationship between
what is often assumed to be supernatural and what is natural. As the prophet says,
God clothed Himself in servitude by giving the world His Shechinah,
His ‘indwelling’ and has permitted His Shechinah to enter into the
process of history and to share the contradictions and sufferings of
the world, and has sent His Shechinah into exile with man and with
Israel.83 It is written: ' In all its distress is He distressed.’ The
Shechinah is not inviolable by stripes and wounds; it has identified
itself wholly with our fate, our misery, our very guilt. When we sin, it
experiences our sinfulness as something that happens to it. It shares
not only our shame but also the disgraces which we would not
acknowledge as such; these it tastes in all their shamefulness. And the
other way is this, that He has placed the redemption of His world in
the power of our return to good. It is written: ' Turn back, O sons, who
have turned away and I will heal your turnings away.' God would
make perfect His creation not otherwise than by our help. He will not
reveal His kingdom until we have established it. He will not assume
the crown of the kings of the world until He can receive it from our
hands. He will not be reunited with His Shechinah until we bring it to
Him as a gift. With dusty and bleeding feet He permits His Shechinah
to tread the road of earth because we do not take pity upon it. For this
reason all calculations concerning the end of time are false and all
attempts to calculate it to bring nearer the coming of the Messiah
must fail. In truth all such things deflect us from the one thing
needful, which is this, to reunite Him and the Shechinah by virtue of
our return to good. Truly there is a mystery here. But he who knows
it cannot make it known, and he who feigns to make it known proves
thereby that he knows it not. And truly there is a miracle here. But he
who would perform it will surely fail; only he who does not attempt it
dare hope to have a share in it. Redemption is at the door. It depends
only and alone upon our return to good, our teshuvah.84
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The prophet here conceives of a basic assumption regarding the relationship
of man or woman to God. It is a relation of “teshuvah”, “turning”. Let us turn to the
idea of turning now.
Teshuvah
For the prophet, turning is a fundamental relation. Turning is conceived as a
primordial way of relating, stemming from the assumed category of otherness. It is
the way that all things relate to other things. Without the idea, it would be
impossible to situate things other than to assume some kind of amalgamation where
differences are ignored. And how does one begin to “turn” to God? Buber puts it in
the mouth of the prophet: "when we deem ourselves lost it is a sign that God is
about to let his quality of mercy prevail over his quality of exacting judgment. God is
no magician; a magician would find no time for exercising mercy."85 The first step
in turning to God is to “deem oneself lost”, that is, to recognize the gulf that
separates a person from another person and indeed from the ultimate other person,
God. This is a kind of despair which the prophet sees as fundamental in turning to
others and ultimately to God. The prophet speaks of “periods of great trial” as times
of “the eclipse of God”, times in which there is “no awareness of [God]”, the
overcoming of which means that “the unimaginable must take place in us” so that
we might turn to Him.86 But what of the probability that the gods to which men
seem to turn are images which they have constructed? Buber puts in the mouth of
the prophet a caveat:
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one must not be too hard on men because they carve themselves
images with a glorious and good-natured face and substitute these for
God, seeing that it is so cruelly difficult to live in His real presence.
And so, when we desire to lead men to God, we must not simply
overthrow their idols. In each of these images we must seek to
discover what divine quality he who carved it sought, in spite of
everything, to delineate. Then tenderly and prudently we must help
him to find the way to that quality. Our mission is not to the realms in
which dwells the purity of holiness; it is to the unholy that we must
pay attention so that it find redemption and become whole.87
That is to say, the prophet is concerned with the process of turning to the
other, not so much with the absolute nature of the one to whom one turns, since that
is to be discovered in the turning alone, not in treating the one to whom one turns as
an object to examine.
There is another concern the prophet addresses, the ways that genuine
turning to others and ultimately to God might become institutionalized as people
submit the process to systemization. Communities can lose sight of their original
intent. Turning to God can morph into something regimented and overloaded with
concerns that have little to do with the ways that people turn to others and to God
through them.88 This is an important assumption which will figure significantly in
the next chapter in which Buber’s ideas are applied in educational settings.89
Once it is established that people might be conceived as turning to one
another and to God ultimately, the next assumption to make concerns the role of the
human will in this turning. The prophet relates the idea that congregations only
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arise if the person who is destined to teach actually wants a congregation to form.
Considering the claim that God could force a person to start a community, the
prophet declares that such a god would seem cruel. Concerning this issue, the
prophet admits, "I have learned to know something of the judgment of God, and it
was incomprehensible to me even as it was to Job."90 This represents an
assumption regarding the kinds of knowledge from which the prophet is willing to
draw. Concerning the subject of God, the prophet is willing to consider a variety of
ideas, especially of the sort of the unknown. Essential incomprehensibility does not in
this case imply non-existence. Nor does it imply that an incomprehensible other or
that the absolutely incomprehensible other, God, is unworthy of attention. It just
means that the other cannot be so simply categorized as comprehensible. This is an
ontological assumption which justifies the category of the incomprehensible.
It is worth noting that the Biblical character, Job, never stopped paying
attention to God, though he certainly could not comprehend Him and ended his
trials amid mild paroxysm. Turning to God was for Job an inclusive act, admitting
into his own relation with the world the incomprehensibility of the God Who
nevertheless showed up, Whom Job could no longer ignore, to Whom turning
became a necessity. Not turning to God would have seemed a kind of inattention to
the nth degree. Any other kind of failure to turn would certainly not seem as
significant.
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The Shechinah
Of the actualization of the life of God in a person’s life, Buber conceives of this
as a living outward from an inward presence of the Shechinah. As the prophet says,
"[The Shechinah] breathed His breath into us, and if we are able to live from within
outward as no other created thing may do, it is because His breath enables us to do
so.”91 The prophet conceives of the ultimate expression of this as a kind of
unification of God with His people, Israel, a joining of the Shechinah with people.
The attempt at unification, something thought to be possible only in Israel, is said to
be what kills the prophet in the end.92
This process of living outward from the inward manifestation of the
Shechinah is said to be an effect of God’s humbling of Himself. As the prophet says,
God clothed Himself in servitude by giving the world His Shechinah,
His ‘indwelling’ and has permitted His Shechinah to enter into the
process of history and to share the contradictions and sufferings of
the world, and has sent His Shechinah into exile with man and with
Israel. It is written: ‘In all its distress is He distressed.’93
In a plea to a crowd of Jews and Christians seeking healing, the prophet offers
the following moving words:
My brethren, my brethren. You suffer the suffering of mortality and
the Shechinah suffers your suffering with you. With you it is lame and
stricken and with you it laments your lamentations. I do not know
why you suffer; I do not know how help is to be brought you; I do
know that redemption will come. The redemption of the Shechinah
will come. When that comes the woe of man will come to an end and
with it your woe. God, the God of the suffering, will bless you. I bless
you in His Name. To the becoming One of the Holy One, blessed be He,
and His Shechinah!94
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So the prophet’s vision of the future involves the redemption of the
Shechinah when suffering will cease. Until then, the assumption is that the
Shechinah is suffering with people. Still, the prophet is aware of the temptations
men face when the pursuit of the presence of God becomes an end in itself, as if from
one level to another, in an attempt to gain power from level to level. He notes that
the high levels can become objects in themselves. Then a person’s devotion to God
alone would be in question, even though he or she might think of the devotion as
entirely God-centered.95
A final word may be said regarding the relationship of the individual and the
Shechinah in the prophet’s ontological framework. It involves at the most
fundamental level what the prophet calls “hesed.” In a play on words, Buber puts in
the mouth of one of the prophet’s disciples the following:
It is written: 'The world is built by virtue of grace.' What is here called
grace, hesed, is the mutual love between the Lord and His vassals, his
hasidim. In every moment of life up to his very last moment, the
world can be rebuilt for a hasid by hesed.96
What is here translated as grace is in other places translated as unconditional
love. Hesed reflects the kind of unilateral grace which a ruler might bestow on a
subject, as of that bestowed by an ancient suzerain on his subjects.97 It says in a
way, “Regardless of what you may do, I will keep my end of the bargain.” This is
what makes the relationship unconditional. It is also what prevents it from being
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identified as just another kind of objectifying relationship. This relationship is
shown in the Bible, in the book of the prophet Hosea. Hosea is said to have taken a
prostitute as a wife. After she returns to prostitution, Hosea redeems her with all
the money he has. In spite of her unfaithfulness, he loves her unconditionally. This
kind of relationship is of the type assumed to exist between God and His people by
the prophetic figure in Buber’s novel. Indeed, “the world can be rebuilt for a Hasid
by Hesed.”98 No matter what a person has done, redemption is possible, since the
relationship into which one has entered is unconditional.
The Unintentional
An ontological assumption regarding the role of intention in relation to
outcome figures importantly in the novel. A parable relayed by one of the prophet’s
disciples tells how the intention of a rabbi to have his disciples blow the shofar
(ram’s horn) merely as an act of obedience turned out to have the effect of causing a
storm to subside, though this was not the intention of the rabbi, who only wanted
his disciples to blow the shofar as an act of obedience before the ship sank, a fact of
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which he was certain.99 What is being taught here about the prophet’s ontological
vision is that material causation is not the only thing to which attention should be
paid, since perceived material causes might in themselves only be distractions. Acts
might have intentions which have little or no relationship to outcomes. In fact, in a
kind of circular logic, the intention to make outcomes fit intentions might undo the
intended effect(s). As the prophet’s disciple, Bunam, says, “Had he [the Rabbi]
intended to perform a miracle [by blowing the shofar], they would not have been
saved." This assumption regarding the not-so-relevant relationship of intentions
and effects figures elsewhere in the novel, fundamentally in the juxtaposition of the
Seer’s intention to influence the outcome of the Napoleonic wars over against the
prophet’s refusal to pursue that objective. The Maggid, a friend of the prophet who
shared his vision of things, tells the Seer the following:
Do not believe that I did not know how lofty was your aim in your
conflict with that disciple [the prophet] who opposed your
undertakings. Nevertheless did you feed the heavenly fire with mortal
substance.100
The words here, “feed the heavenly fire with mortal substance”, are
cautionary. They point to the prophet’s awareness that action itself ought not to be
conceived entirely in terms of causation. There are reasons for things that should
not be expressed solely in terms of discernible causation. And there are effects of
things of which the things themselves, a kind of heavenly fire, are inexpressible.
They are things we do not know and cannot know. The Maggid actually refuses to
answer a question about Messianic outcomes coming from the Seer: “It is not fitting
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for such a creature as man to return an answer to such a question as [the Seer’s].
There is an Other [God] who must answer it."101
Righteousness Vs. Having Rights
The Maggid rebukes the Seer for being concerned about the actions of the
French and the Russians in the Napoleonic wars:
We arise against that power which awakens and nourishes
wickedness and iniquity and hostility to God in the souls of men. For
wickedness and iniquity are in the souls of all men, in ours as well as
in theirs. The combat against God's enemies is the combat against
that power which causes wickedness and iniquity to wax great in the
human soul. When we see them burgeon and bloom, then we know
what they would be at. As they fade, all the power of evil which they
have concentrated [is] scattered. But Thou, O Lord, are exalted in
world-time. There is no covenant between God and Belial.102
The way of the prophet is about being righteous, that is, in a relationship with
God through right relationships with people, not about pursuing the ends and
means of political activism as a game of materialist causation. “There is no covenant
between God and Belial," as the Maggid says. This involves the awareness that
“heavenly fire” is not discernible. Though it is not objectifiable, it nevertheless is
the cause of the kinds of outcomes to which the prophet is pointing.103 As the
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prophet says, "Never will a work of man have a good issue if we do not think of the
souls whom it is given us to help, and of the life between soul and soul, and of our
life with them and of their lives with each other. We cannot help the coming of
redemption if life does not redeem life."104 This is pointing away from the concerns
of the Seer and of his disciples, involving the manipulation of world affairs without
regard to the care of the souls of men.
Situating the importance of ontological assumptions in his educational
community, Buber puts in the mouth of the prophet the following:
We do not demand what the world calls rights. All that we need is
that the people of Israel have the right to arrange its life according to
the directions of its God…God scattered us and is purifying us in the
flames of suffering…You are permitted to dwell together, even though
you have been partitioned among your enemies...you are beginning to
see that in the lives of people the mystery of suffering is allied to the
mystery of Messiah...the return to good is born in the depth of
suffering and this return evokes redemption...the return is the
beginning of justice, completed by redemption...105
Buber is situating himself ontologically. He assumes the idea of God as well
as the possibility of a relationship of people with God and with each other in terms
of it. He sees desired action in terms of this and is not concerned with rights as
objective ends in themselves, taken out of this context. Through this it is possible
for Buber to embrace the mystery of suffering as it relates to a people’s turning to

people, without regard to intended outcomes, since we cannot know what they may or may not
be, since we cannot know the future. That said, lest the argument be dismissed as a kind of
pursuit of powerlessness, an inherently impotent stance, this contention is indeed a call to a kind
of power which transcends awareness of material causation. It is pointing to a kind of “heavenly
fire”, once given attention, promises to set ablaze the course of action in the world. It involves the
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God and to the possibilities of justice in terms of it. Out of this context, the terms
make no sense for Buber.
It is my purpose now to extend the ideas concerning some of the prophet’s
ontological concerns into his approach to others and how this is situated in his view
of knowledge. The concern within the next and last part of this chapter has to do
with the prophet’s epistemology.

The Prophet’s Epistemology
Knowledge as Response
Reflecting his ontological stance concerning the questionable relation of
intention and effect, the prophet often sends his disciples on journeys which have no
discernible, stated goal.106 No wonder, for his assumptions regarding the presence
of the Shekinah mean that along such journeys mysterious things would and should
indeed happen. This points to an epistemology embracing the numinous, that there
is a kind of knowledge of things which arises among people as they journey through
life, in particular contexts and not apart from them. "The road of the world," the
prophet says,
is the road upon which we all fare onward to meet the death of the
body. And the places in which we meet the Shechinah are those in
which good and evil are blended, whether without or within us. In the
anguish of the exile which it suffers, the Shechinah looks at us and its
glance beseeches us to set free good from evil. If it be but the tiniest
fragment of pure good, which is brought to light, the Shechinah is
helped thereby. But we avoid its glance, because we 'can not'. That is
not strange when it comes to the rest of us. But Lublin may not avoid
the glance; Lublin dare not doubt but what it 'can'!107
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Martin Buber describes evil as the tendency to turn away from others and
ultimately from God, the wholly other.108 He further describes the evil urge, or
tendency to turn away from God, as present in everyone. So it is in the context of
conflicted intention that Buber discovers the possibility of turning to God. In
everyone there is a conflict, and it is in the context of this conflict that knowledge of
others and of God can arise. Once turned to the other, knowledge of the other or in
relation to the other is possible. The prophet says that he would not consider it wise
to judge another person’s judgment of his own experience before trying to
understand the experience of the person judging him.
Buber speaks of knowledge in the contexts of meetings with others as a
response to what is happening.
You may meet the Shechinah upon the very roads of the earth. And
what do you do when this meeting takes place? Do you stretch out
your hands? Do you help raise up the Shechinah from the very dust of
the road? And yet who should do this thing if not the men of
Lublin109?110
The prophet is here pointing to responsible action as a responding to the ones
one may meet, not with a priori knowledge of such encounters had before such
meetings, but with openness to the possibilities of those others. This is said to
counter the claims of the Seer’s disciples that spoke of Lublin “as the land of Israel,
the court of the Seer's house as Jerusalem, [his] house of study as Mt. Moriah and the
room of the Seer as the Holy of Holies wherein the Shechinah speaks from his
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throat.”111 He casts doubt on the status of the Seer’s miracles, asking whether one
could know whether the Seer “hides himself behind all his miracles, in order that [he
might not be seen], himself.”112 He reminds us, further, of the following:
The serpent's ‘lying truth’ was that men and women would know good
and evil like one who creates both…as two forms of being, which are
as contradictory to each other as light and darkness. The Holy One,
Blessed be He, knows the two things which He has created and goes
on creating, namely, good and evil, even as he knows light and
darkness, as two things, which at the very ends of the earth stand
opposite each other and opposed to each other. But the first human
beings, so soon as they had eaten of the fruit of the tree, knew good
and evil as blended and confused. It is this blending and confusion
which was brought into the world through their deed.113

The knowledge of good and evil of which scripture speaks114 refers itself to a
kind of knowledge of things which is fixed and easily described. But Buber is
pointing here through the prophet to a kind of truth which cannot be known except
in the context of the encounter with good and evil in encounters with others, to
which a proper response isn’t the gaining of some objective knowledge of good and
evil but rather a response to it through turning to God by turning to others. Buber
points to this non-objective way of knowing in the introduction to the text:
I, myself, have no 'doctrine'. My function is to point out realities of
this order. He who expects of me a teaching other than a pointing out
of this character, will always be disillusioned. And it would seem to
me, indeed, that in this house of history the crucial thing is not to
possess a fixed doctrine, but rather to recognize eternal reality and
out of its depth to be able to face the reality of the present. No way
can be pointed to in this desert night. One's purpose must be to help
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men of today to stand fast, with their soul in readiness, until the dawn
breaks and a path becomes visible where none suspected it.115
Buber interprets the ideas of good and evil existentially and thereby points to
responsibility as “[facing] the reality of the present”, taking one’s grounding in
“eternal realities”, those ontological assumptions which are foundational to all
thought and action. “Helping men [and women] to stand fast” is a kind of adherence
to the Golden Rule, one’s doing to others as one would have others do to one. It does
not involve imposing on people strictures from without. It refers itself rather to that
kind of living “from inside out” referred to in the previous section on ontology. The
prophet’s disciple Mendel of Kozk speaks further of the prophet’s perspective
concerning knowledge:
My heart is at one with those among Israel who today, equally distant
from blind traditionalism and blind contradictoriness, strive with a
striving meant to precede a renewal of the forms of both faith and life.
This striving is the continuation of the Hasidic striving; it takes place
in a historic hour in which a slowly receding light has yielded to
darkness.116
The prophet’s perspective of knowledge is one which involves “the renewal
of both faith and life.” It is not in itself a rejection of traditional forms or an attempt
to be contrary for the sake of being contrary. "The Torah warns us not to make an
idol even of the command of God", the prophet reminds us.117 This would involve
the reinterpretation of tradition in the light of real encounters with others. In other
words, traditions might figure more powerfully as they are given life in real
encounters, as they become meaningful ways to respond to others in critical times.
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Fixing these traditions in immovable stone, unresponsive to the needs of particular
encounters, would amount to a kind of idolatry. The prophet admits that he had
“come to recognize the truth of this way [Hasidism]”, but that the truth itself
involves more than the truths of Hasidism, since it involves “all that takes place
between [a person and his or her] fellow-man [or fellow woman].”118
The truth to which the prophet is pointing is existential truth. That place
between a person and his or her fellow human being is the place “where Satan
meets his limitation, seeing that love really exists and has no limitation.”119 It is in
this place without limitation that real knowledge of others occurs and belongs to
these encounters. Concerning good and evil in these contexts, the prophet puts it
eloquently:
It does not suffice me to know the truth concerning the evil that is in
the world. And I certainly gain no experience of evil when I meet my
fellow-man. For in that case I can grasp it only from without,
estrangedly or with hatred and contempt, in which case it really does
not enter my vision; or else, I overcome it with my love and in that
case I have no vision of it either. I experience it when I meet myself.
Within me, where no element of strangeness has divisive force and no
love has redeeming force, there do I directly experience that
something which would force me to betray God and which seeks to
use for that purpose the powers of my own soul. At that point I
understand that the evil of the world is mighty and that I cannot
master it by virtue of what I do to my fellow-man, because it, itself,
uses the power of love in order to poison what we have healed.120
Buber is pointing here in the words of the prophet away from simplistic
analyses of others in which labels of good and evil are used to objectify people to a
more humble stance in relation to others. It is impossible to experience evil by

118

Ibid., 57.
Ibid.
120 Ibid.
119

49

observing a person, says the prophet, since the observation itself would involve
hatred and contempt, in which case the observation would be skewed. A similar
thing is said of overcoming evil with one’s love. It would not enter one’s experience.
The observer would have entered his own field of vision, affecting it. Pointing to a
more humble place, he suggests that the evil that people encounter is really within
themselves. He speaks of this evil further, against the words of the disciples of the
Seer who want to see Gog as an evil that exists in the world alone, which can be
manipulated:
What is the nature of this Gog? He can exist in the outer world only
because he exists within us. The darkness out of which he was hewn
needed to be taken from nowhere else than from our own slothful and
malicious hearts. Our betrayal of God has made Gog to grow so great.
Neither in the soul nor in the people does the power of the light
prevail.121
It is there that “no element of strangeness has divisive force and no love has
redeeming force”, where a person “directly experience[s] that something which
would force [one] to betray God and which seeks to use for that purpose the powers
of [one’s] own soul.”122
Knowledge as Limited
And what of the “powers of the soul?” What do men and women bring to
encounters with others as well as to their own experience that has the power to
heal? Perhaps it is expressed by the prophet, curiously enough, after he ends his
discussion concerning the evil of the world and its use of love to poison what has
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been healed, when he says, “it is impossible to leave things at this point.”123 The
prophet goes on almost immediately to say,
it is here below that we are stationed and it does not behoove us to
desert our post. It is here that we are to combat evil. Every heaven
becomes an earth….the way…may be likened to the building of a road.
You drag up your stones, you beat them into the earth, you roll the
roller over them. Naturally you do not stick to the same place. You do
get on. Such is the way.124
The prophet is pointing here to the locus of the “powers of the soul” as things
that are mortal, things here in the world, so it is not necessary to look beyond what
is here in the present to find the mechanism of healing about which the prophet
speaks, though he assumes that it is founded in God. “Freedom dwells with God”,
says the prophet.125 He carries this theme forward in the following:
There are many who seek to interpret the things that are now coming
to pass in the world. They assure us that these things are the birth
pangs of the messiah or something comparable. But we say that it is
not given us to know whether this be so or not. Those others are of
the opinion that we should try to exert mystic influences in order that
the shape of things be such as it should be. But we here do not believe
that we have any duty except to turn to God with our whole being and
to seek to establish His kingdom by a communal life of justice, of love,
of consecration. Those others reproach us for interfering with their
plans. But we have recognized the facts that all those plans of theirs
turn us aside from the one thing that God demands of us.126
The prophet is not pointing to “mystic influences” here, but rather to the
establishment, or rather the seeking for the establishment of communal life
involving justice, love and consecration. He puts it in a prayer, pointing to the
mechanism of healing:
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And am I not, Ribbono shel 'olam [Master of the Universe], Thy child?
Yet I do not beseech Thee to reveal to me the mysteries of Thy way; I
could not endure them. But this I pray Thee to reveal to me, deeply
and clearly, what this thing that now happens means to me, what it
demands of me, and what Thou, Master of the universe, wouldst
communicate to me through it. Ah, I would not know why I suffer,
only whether I suffer for Thy sake!127
Here the answer is given to the question, “What do people bring to
encounters that is healing?” The answer lies in the prayer. Attention to what is
happening at the moment and to what it demands of the person is what is needed.
The prophet refers to this as something that is revealed by God. This way of
knowing involves turning and is an effect of what is ontologically foundational for
the prophet, that what God demands of us is that we turn to others and in the
process turn to Him. Responding to what is over against a person is the one thing
that is needed. The understanding that the response is for the sake of heaven is
situated in the deep ontological foundation, that God speaks to people through the
events of their lives, if they are paying attention.
Knowledge as Suffering
What may be said further is that the nature of the response to others here
may involve suffering. Indeed in this case it appears that it must involve it, for the
prophet assumes in the prayer that “the thing that now happens” is a kind of
suffering, since he asks concerning the things that are happening to him whether he
is suffering for the sake of God. This points to a way of knowing which is situated in
suffering. This suggests that there are revelations which are possible only in
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suffering, a frightening epistemology to be sure.128 There is a way of knowing which
is found in suffering for oneself, but this is not the kind of knowing to which the
prophet is pointing.

Conclusion
I have attempted in this chapter to say something of the historical context of
Buber’s narrative. It concerns the lives of two rabbis pitted against the backdrop of
17th and 18th century Poland. In an attempt to get at Buber’s philosophy, I have
examined the ontology and epistemology of the chief character in the novel through
whom Buber relates his own philosophy.129 The result is a somewhat extensive
examination of ontological material which reflects the views of a Hasidic Rabbi of
the 17th century. Carrying these assumptions forward, I have attempted to examine
the epistemology of Buber’s main character, his philosophy of knowing. What
remains in the upcoming chapter three will first involve the consideration of what
communities of learning would look like given the ontological and epistemological
assumptions of Buber’s main character, the prophet. The following chapter four will
involve criticism of the prophet’s assumptions. For both chapters, I will take my cue
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from Buber’s own work in For the Sake of Heaven. The Hasidic community under
the leadership of the prophet will provide a role model as I consider the shape that
communities built on the assumptions of the prophet’s ontology and epistemology
might take (prophetic communities). In the fourth chapter, criticism of the prophet’s
ideas and behavior taken from the novel will help shape the criticism I bring to bear
on Buber’s ideas, along with criticism taken from the work of other scholars
interested in Buber.
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CHAPTER III The Believing Game
Introduction
I turn to consider the educational implications of the prophetic narrative I
have described. What would our educational communities look like were we to take
what Buber is saying in For the Sake of Heaven seriously? Here I will attempt to pay
attention to the possibilities of educational communities built upon Buber’s
ontological and epistemological foundations, as they are made to appear in his
novel. I think it is necessary to reiterate some of those basic ontological and
epistemological assumptions considered in chapter two, to make the unfolding
narrative here seem consistent and to limit what might be said about the shape
educational communities so affected might take.
The pivotal prophetic assumption in Buber’s novel is that turning is a basic
way of relating to others. This idea forms the basis of considering the way that
people relate with one another, and through one another, ultimately, with God.
Turning is assumed to involve suffering, but it is assumed to be possible because of
hesed, unconditional love. This turning is considered not to be an act which controls
desired outcomes, but rather an act conceived in terms other than mere causation
and intention. Rather the act of turning as Buber conceives of it points to effects
which are not expressible and to actions of an unintentional sort. Buber points
away from justifications of actions based on intended objectives, but rather to the
call to be responsive to others, to have right relations with others, without reference
to intentions.
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With this brief summary of chapter two in mind, I would like to begin a
discussion of the kinds of effects which might be observed in educational
communities taking Buber’s narrative as their guide. I intend to use Buber’s
description of the community under the leadership of the prophet to frame the
discussion. First, I consider the role of students in relation to others within their
community. From these observations I imagine how students in similar educational
communities might be transformed were they to take on similar characteristics.
Likewise, I consider the ways that the Prophet relates to his students, and out of this
frame a discussion about the role of educators in educational communities similarly
imagined. I further consider how educators and students might relate to others
outside the immediate community, given some of Buber’s descriptions of the
Prophet’s community.

The Role of Disciple
Let me begin by considering the role that students in the Prophet’s
community took on in Buber’s novel. This might be considered in terms of
particular qualities that seem to have characterized the community. Among these
characteristics are loyalty, willingness to serve, readiness for the unintended,
joyfulness and humility.
Loyalty
The kind of educational community built on Buber’s model of prophetic
education exhibits the quality of loyalty between students and teachers. “Long life
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to the Yehudi” was a mystic saying one of the Prophet’s students uttered.130
Another of the Prophet’s students chose to die rather than to live in the world
without him. At least that was his sentiment when he told the Prophet, “I have come
to see that you must soon take leave of the earth, and I would not stay here without
you.”131 This is quite remarkable that an educational community would engender
this level of devotion of a student to his or her teacher, but it seems possible in the
kind of community of which Buber is speaking. Lest the possibility of this kind of
loyalty be called into question, it might be profitable to consider that this kind of
devotion might be attributed to other qualities of the community. What about such
a community would tend to engender devotion of this kind? One instance in the
prophet’s life with his students might give some idea of the kind of relationship he
imagined he had with his students and therefore the kind of relationships he
pursued. The prophet told a story in which he noticed the Hebrew letters, yod and
yod placed one above the other.132 “When two Yods (Jews) stand beside each other
it signifies the name of God; but when one stands above the other it does not signify
the name of God.”133 Buber is considering the idea that an absolute quality of
community happens when people are considered as equals, in a sense, beside one
another. This is the way, as it were, that God is known in such communities. One
way to define this is in terms of a non-example. Those communities, like the Seer’s
own, which pit students and teachers against one another, one member above or
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below another one, would not tend to evoke qualities like loyalty. They would
rather tend to give rise to competition and objectification. Rather than be loyal to
another student or to a teacher, a student might tend to want to be combative, set at
odds with other members of the community.
Willingness to Serve
The setting of members of an educational community beside one another and
not above or below gives rise to another quality, namely the willingness to serve.
Setting people beside one another makes it possible to entertain the idea that there
are many and various ways of serving. The Prophet confirmed a saying of the Seer
in this regard:
It will not do to tell one’s comrade what way he is to pursue. There is
a way of serving God by study, another of serving Him by prayer; one
by deeds of loving-kindness toward one’s fellows; there is a way to be
pursued by fasting and there is one to be pursued by eating. All these
are right ways to the service of God. But each man is to observe well
toward which one of these ways his heart inclines him. Thereupon he
is to be active upon that way with all his might.134
Readiness for the Unintended

The willingness to serve brings up another characteristic of educational
communities like the prophet’s. There is a unique attitude toward the idea of
intention which lends itself to the qualities of openness to the miraculous and of
readiness for the unintended. The prophet defined “decision” differently, not as a
response to a suggestion or to a call, but as an involuntary, inexplicable happening.
He said that it comes, “as when, at the end of a run, one leaps. But if a man says to
134
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you: ‘Leap!’ and you leap from your stance, that is not yet a deciding. To be sure,
Rabbi David bade me come hither often enough. I could not. Then, suddenly, this
time I could.”135 This playful approach to the idea of decision making leads to the
consideration of indecisiveness as possibly a preferred quality. In communities like
the Prophet’s, it may be preferable at most times to avoid making a priori decisions.
In educational communities taking on the characteristics of the Prophet’s
community, there would be less time for planning intended outcomes and more
time for spontaneous happenings. “The heart of man is not evil,” says the Prophet,
“only its ‘imagination’ is so; that is to say that what it produces and devises
arbitrarily, separating itself from the goodness of creation, that is the thing called
evil.”136 Intention lends itself to a certain level of arbitrariness since it is not given
to us to know the future. The planning that occupies so much time in educational
communities may in itself be a kind of distancing of the community from the kind of
community to which Buber is pointing. Buber puts in the mouth of the Prophet
these words, reminding us that in the matter of intentions, all parties seem to be on
a level playing field, whether considered good or ill. Speaking of his persecutors, the
Prophet says,
The fundamental motive of their persecution of me is to serve
Heaven.137 What is their predominant intention? Since it has been
long known that Rabbi Israel will decline the succession, they desire
to secure it for Rabbi Joseph, and why is that their intention? Because
they believe that the succession of son to father in the function of
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Zaddik138 is the desire of Heaven. Assuredly, they are in error. They
will affect nothing for Rabbi Joseph, and as for me, it is not I who stand
in his way; I stand in no man’s way.139
The point of this is to say that intention does not occupy a central place in
communities like the Prophet’s. That is, the intentions of the members of the
community are on an equal footing and so cannot be used to guide the community
forward. Communities which understand this might begin to experience a strong
openness to the possibilities of the unintended or else of the unplanned, indeed, of
the surprising and miraculous.
It would indeed be difficult to build a community like the Prophet’s with
positivist assumptions regarding the role that intention plays. Do x so y will happen.
That is the way of intention. Reliance upon observations pitted against perceived
outcomes in causal relations would seem to be precisely what communities like the
prophet’s are not about. Were our own educational communities to begin to pay
attention to communities like the prophet’s, less attention might be paid to the
stated intentions of educational policy and practice with more attention paid to
preparing students and teachers alike to the possibilities of being surprised! And
this leads to the consideration of another characteristic of communities like the
prophet’s, the quality of joyfulness.
Joyfulness
It is noted in Buber’s novel that one of the prophet’s disciples liked playing
chess “with people of questionable character.”140 He sang songs as he played which
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were appropriate to the chess moves and which touched people’s hearts. He is also
reported to play guitar while preparing medicine.141 Another of the Prophet’s
disciples tricked the Seer into letting him drink from his Kiddush cup by dressing up
like a peasant merchant, a joke even the Seer enjoyed.142 This kind of playfulness
would represent a novel approach in systems of education. Less attention to issues
of control might allow educational communities more experiences of joy.
Humility
This quality of joyfulness is related to another characteristic of the prophet’s
community, humility. Joy is a communal event, something that is shared with others.
It tends to put the members of a community on equal footing. This lends itself to
humility. Concerning the prophet’s students, perhaps due most significantly to what
was characteristic in the prophet’s own way of relating with his students, the
pursuit of power for its own sake was increasingly made to be a non-issue.
Beginning with the practice of seating in communal gatherings, the disciples of the
prophet sat informally in ways promoting humility. “Not as in Lublin did they sit at
a long table with the rabbi at the head. The benches stood at random, and
somewhere on one of them the teacher occupied a temporary seat, so that, despite
the deep seriousness of his leadership, the picture presented was one of an
uncomplicated and familiar comradeship.”143 While it is true that the prophet’s
disciples sometimes conceived of relationships in terms of power, the prophet was

140

Ibid., 151.
Ibid.
142 Ibid., 90, 194.
143 Ibid., 230.
141

61

concerned with pointing to other ways of being and relating. One of the prophet’s
students thought the prophet was “proceeding into the world to bring his old
adversaries to an accounting” at one point.144 But this was far from the truth.
Were students in our own educational communities shown ways to joyfully
and humbly consider one another, such openness to others would no doubt result in
understandings which are not planned, surprising “outcomes”, unintended yet
fulfilling in ways that can’t even be described, especially since they are
unintentional. One of the prophet’s disciples, so affected by his time in the prophet’s
community, began to understand what forest birds were saying. It was so
surprising to him, he actually prayed that the ability would leave him.145 Our own
educational communities should welcome this kind of unexpected happening.
Learning the language of birds in unintended ways is an example of the kind of
unintended effect that would bring new life to our communities. Taking this on
board, we would open ourselves up to unlimited outcomes, not settling short of the
miraculous.

The Role of the Prophet
It is my intention now to move to fully consider the role of the Prophet in
relation to his disciples. Here I see characteristic approaches to others reflecting
the Prophet’s philosophy. Conceptions of cooperation, freedom, effectiveness,
power, relationality, humility, duty, generosity, the embrace of the oppositional and
encouragement effect the Prophet’s behavior in the community. These ideas give
144
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rise to ways of being which foster equality and openness to others. Taking these on,
we would build our own communities on foundations of equality and openness.
Cooperation
Concerning desire and intention, the prophet seems to respond to joint
ventures, not to dictates made with measured outcomes in mind. He prefers
cooperation to arbitrary direction. When a friend of his invites him to his home for
Succoth, the prophet responds to his invitation, “Let us journey together to Lublin”,
by saying, “Let us do so.”146 Given directives, the prophet tends to ignore them.
Apparently, the Prophet is not a “yes man”. Were we to occupy positions in our
educational communities in similar ways, we might not be well received.
Nevertheless, along with academics like bell hooks, we might learn to transgress
borders, challenging directives, pointing to other ways of being and relating.147 We
would seek a kind of serendipitous coming together involving the desires of
students and teachers and of our own institutions. In this way, our communities’
effects might be transformative and our directives more flexible.
Concerning directives given in educational communities, the Prophet sees
the effects of institutionalization as negative.
After Moses came the Judges and after the Judges the Prophets and
after the Prophets the men of the Great Synagogue. Then came the
Tannaim and Amoriam and so it went on to the time of the
admonishers. And when this thing, too, was defiled, and false
admonishers multiplied, then arose the Zaddikim. And now I sigh
because I see that this thing, too, is at the point of defilement. 148
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Freedom
Similarly, the prophet decries education as compulsory.
God…is the God of freedom. He, who has all power wherewith to
compel me, does not compel me. He has permitted me to have a share
in His freedom. I betray Him when I permit myself to be compelled.149
Education is free, which means in this context that its members ought not be
compelled by forces external to themselves regarding participation and as well in
relation to outcomes to be achieved in educational communities. Were we to take
on this understanding, our educational communities would be altogether voluntary,
with members choosing to participate in activities which are in themselves free.
Such an experiment has been attempted at Summerhill, where participation in
student activities is not compulsory.150 Similar approaches have also been used in
Montessori schools, where students are allowed flexibility in learning at their own
pace and in their own ways.151
There are other possibilities which could be considered in elementary and
secondary settings in which emphasis is placed on relationships and not on
intended outcomes. In fact, Buber points to this in the context of a discussion about
the Seer’s attempt to manipulate the emperor, to achieve a favorable outcome in the
Napoleonic Wars. As the Prophet says, "We stand, as it were, bound and an easy
prey to that burning, which our leaders seek to intensify.”152 This charge that the
Seer was intensifying a burning was in effect a criticism that the Seer was delving
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into things that were not important for the community and that had the potential to
harm the community. It serves as a powerful indictment of educational systems
which set outcomes which are inimical to right relationships in educational
communities. Reflecting on the absolutely perverse practice of setting outcomes for
members of educational communities which pay scant or no attention to actual
relationships between people, Buber’s narrative involves the Seer actually directing
the prophet to die and thereby get a message for him from heaven!153 Reflecting the
sheer wickedness of such a directive and an indicator of how prevalent its influence
was, one of the Seer’s disciples believed that it would be better “that Jewish blood
flow until one can wade therein up to the knees from Prystyk to Rymanov, if thereby
our exile be brought to an end and our redemption dawn.”154 This is such a
powerful reminder of the similar, wickedly satirical essay written by Jonathon Swift
during the Irish potato famine, “A Modest Proposal”, in which the author suggests
that Irish children should be fattened up so the British might eat them!155
Not About Effectiveness
The prophet’s being asked to die and the suggestion that Jewish blood should
be spilled for the sake of redemption, like the proposal that Irish children should be
eaten, points to the fact that the prophet’s educational community did not in general
concern itself with the issue of effectiveness. One of the prophet’s disciples asks the
question, speaking of the Seer’s community in Lublin, “Do you know, Jacob Yitzchak
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[the prophet], what it smells of here?” The prophet’s response comes, “Effectiveness
is made a conscious goal here.”156 It appears that the pursuit of effectiveness itself is
a nauseating stench to the prophet! He says, “I must reach the point of learning how
to prevent the evil from using the good in order to crush it.” Outcomes based
approaches to education become in this light damnable. Were we to seriously
consider Buber’s powerful critique here, we would abandon outcomes-based
approaches to education. Our systems of education would give up attempts at
manipulating outcomes, which have been shown to have at times been
manufactured in any case.157 Results can indeed be fabricated, especially in the
context of systems in which they are the be all and end all of discussions and
concerns about education. Our communities need to look elsewhere, and taking on
Buber’s narrative would help.
Not About Power
Pointing further to the problems associated with the pursuit of power for its
own sake, in which quagmire modern systems of education are often entrenched, the
prophet asks one of his disciples:
What is the device of the Evil Spirit? He shows to each the high levels
he can reach and lets him reach them. Then is that man's mind fixed
upon the levels; then he is no longer devoted to God alone, even
though he thinks he is. The power which alone he does not perceive
to be either delusion or fraud comes in the end to be himself and his
striving from level to level....In Lublin I learned to recognize the
delusion of the levels. And what is a man to do who is thus tempted to
protect himself from the snare of the fowler? He goes into the lonely
156
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forest and stands there and cries out until the levels and grades are
taken from him again.158
Relational
The kind of community to which Buber is pointing is relational at its core. It
is concerned primarily with establishing right relations between people. It avoids
the problems associated with the objectification of people, of the “striving from level
to level”, the “delusion of the levels”. Building on similar foundations, our own
educational communities would cease focusing on outcomes based approaches.
They would open themselves up to other possibilities, particularly to the infinite
potential that is open to systems which trust the human spirit, confident that
members of educational communities will always surprise us with unintended
outcomes, even some that will seem miraculous to us. I would think such a
community would be designed for discovery. It is positioned for surprise.159 And
that leads to questions about the Prophet’s role in his community and to the ways
that teachers in our own communities might take on similar roles.
Humility
What lies at the core of the Prophet’s philosophy, perhaps, is a humble
stance. How appropriate this seems, especially in light of postmodern concern with
the arrogance of metanarratives, attempts to get at absolutistic explanations of
things. There is, it would seem, no such thing as “unified field theory.”160 And there
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is no similar theory explaining everything in any field. There is nothing that
explains everything, if but for the sheer reason that all explanations become part of
the explanations themselves. The observer is observed.161 Given this humility,
educational communities might take on more realistic approaches to praxis, all the
while recognizing the importance of “hidden ones”. As Buber puts it in the novel,
A brother of [the prophet’s] father was one of the thirty-six hidden
Zaddikim. These hidden ones sustain the world. Is the world not
rather sustained by the manifestly righteous who are our leaders?
The manifest just are themselves sustained by these hidden ones.
Moreover, that within them which serves to sustain men belongs to
their hidden and not to their manifest nature. All that sustains
belongs to the realm of the hidden.162
I believe that it might be well put to say that educators who take on Buber’s
narrative here will endeavor to be humble. While this might put this kind of
educator at a disadvantage in a competitive community, it is best for caring
communities like the prophet’s. The prophet was indeed marginalized by other
communities and even by members of his own family at times.163 But he resisted
pitting himself against others, willing rather to consider himself equal to others and
not above them. “Whatever you learn of my life will be equally true of his,” the
Prophet said of another rabbi friend. He did not strive for notoriety.
Concerning the reporting of some miraculous events in the prophet’s life, he
downplayed the events, citing them humbly, “The incidents themselves…are so
spiritually shabby and absurd that I considered it unfitting to trouble your ears
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about them.”164 He is said to have had an unusual relationship with animals, even
understanding their speech.165 In another instance, the prophet consented to bless
an innkeeper, but had inadvertently forgotten his daughter. Begged to bless the
daughter also, the prophet responded somewhat irritably, “I didn't know you had a
daughter… Why is she not here? Let her come out at once.” The little girl came out,
cured of an eleven year illness. Realizing the effect of this later, that an unending
stream of sick and crippled people would be flocking to him for healing, the prophet
thought of the consequences of this miracle as terrible. He did not grasp at elevation
in the community regarding even this miracle. Educators taking on a similarly
humble role would draw to themselves a community of other teachers and students
who would also quell the flames of ambition and competition.
Not about Duty
There is a compulsion among educators, set ablaze by popular ideas about
“duty”, which might be set aright by taking on the role of the prophet. It might also
settle issues about the importance of being earnest.166 Seriousness in intention does
not mitigate the disastrous effects of being governed by intention itself in a
relational context, or so it seems. “It takes a long time before a man [or woman] gets
to understand what his duty is. It is the duties which prevent him from doing so.”167
What this implies is that relationships are the things that should concern us. But we
should not be confused by any sense of duty and rather focus on relationships
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themselves. This leads to the consideration of other qualities regarding
communities like the prophet’s, chief among which are generosity, love, compassion,
the willingness to embrace opposition, tolerance and encouragement.
Generosity
Focusing on relationships leads to generosity. The prophet habitually gave
away any money he had left over nightly to the poor.168 That is a degree of
generosity that is hard to achieve, so it must be that it arises spontaneously in
communities like the prophet’s. In caring communities which are not compulsory,
in which both teachers and students are humble and supportive, this kind of
surprising behavior should be “expected”, as it were.169 Our own educational
communities would be more supportive and generous in relation to our members,
taking this seriously.
Embrace of the Oppositional
A relational focus also lends itself to a loving approach to others, even to
others who are oppositional. It is antithetical to an “us-them” approach to
relationships, what Buber would elsewhere call an “I-it” relationship.170 Love which
embraces the oppositional transgresses borders, to borrow bell hooks’ own
language earlier cited. Buber addresses this kind of embraced of the oppositional
here:

168

Ibid., 161.
Ironically, “expecting” to be surprised may in itself appear to undo whatever surprise one gets. Or
at least that may be what the seeming rhetorical effect appears to be. On the contrary, “expecting
surprise” is not a performance contradiction. It is the unplanned embrace of what has not been
planned.
170 Martin Buber, I and Thou, Tr (Edinburgh,1937).
169

70

be they Philistines or servants of Abraham, hasidim of Satan or true
hasidim, how far shall we carry the distinction? Are only the latter to
be redeemed and not the former, too? When we say, 'Redemption of
the World', do we mean only the redemption of the good? Does not
redemption primarily mean the redeeming of the evil from the evil
ones that make them so? If the world is to be forevermore divided
between God and Satan, how dare we say that it is God's world? ...Are
we to establish a little realm of the righteous and leave the rest to the
Lord? Is it for this that He gave us a mouth which can convey the
truth of our heart to an alien heart and a hand which can
communicate to the hand of our recalcitrant brother something of the
warmth of our very blood? Is it for this that He has made us capable
of loving the sons of Satan? All our teaching is false, too, if we refuse
to test it by them. Right, we are to fight them for the sake of God, we
are to fight inexorably. But we are to fight in order to conquer the
citadel for him, the seven times walled citadel of their soul, and not to
engage in a general massacre for the honor of God! And how dare we
battle against them, if we do not at the same time battle against
ourselves? Are not stubbornness and callousness and sloth and
malice to be found among us and not only among them? If we were to
forget that, if we were to take the contradiction and, instead of
annihilating it, let it cleave to the very depth of the primordial, would
we not in the very midst of our combat against Satan have become his
followers?171
This perspective works against competition and supports cooperation. It
represents a willingness to embrace opposition, not to smother it. The Prophet
himself even embraced the Seer, his bitter rival at times. Speaking of the Seer, the
Prophet made his loyalty clear.
Heaven has bestowed great power upon the Rabbi, and he has
tirelessly devoted this power to the redemption of the world. Even
those who oppose him must revere him. We are all his disciples.
Pshysha strives after another aim than Lublin, but without Lublin it
would be unthinkable. Insofar as I am anything at all, I have become it
through him. He who speaks against him, speaks against me.172
The Prophet’s approach does not dissolve differences, but affirms and
embraces them. In communities taking on this narrative, aggression is transformed
171
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into a positive energy. As the Prophet put it, “we are to fight in order to conquer the
citadel for him, the seven times walled citadel of [his] soul”. This is not to say that
communities like the Prophet’s escape opposition, but rather that they tend to
embrace it. Our own educational communities would do well taking this on board,
seeing our struggles as efforts to free community members. The motivating factor
here is compassion, but this does not mean that there is no struggle. The
educational community is vast and various. We will not all speak with the same
voice. But we are able to give a space to every voice. To not do so would be
“unthinkable”. Doing this would require much creativity. But first and foremost we
must turn to one another. We must avoid easy characterizations of members of our
communities as evil. As the Prophet puts it,
A man will do evil when the evil impulse overwhelms him. But that
does not yet make the man evil. None intends evil. Either he slides
into evil, he knows not how, or else he holds evil to be good. YOU ARE
TO LOVE THIS HUMAN BEING WHO DOES EVIL.173
In our own educational communities, the voices we hear will sometimes
seem strange and ill-advised. We may notice that some members of the community
have turned away from others, entering into objectifying relationships which
threaten to harm other members of our communities. But even these members
must be treated in loving ways. The prophet puts it succinctly:
Lovingly you are to help [the one who does evil] escape this whirl into
which the evil impulse has plunged him; lovingly you must help him
recognize what is above and what is below. Otherwise than lovingly
you will accomplish nothing. He will show you the door and he will be
right to do so. If you call him evil and hate him and contemn him
therefore, you will make him evil even when you desire to help him,
indeed, especially in that case. You will make him evil, for you will
173
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cause him to cut himself off. The man who does evil does not become
evil himself until he is imprisoned in the world of his actions, until he
lets himself be imprisoned by it.174
Taking this kind of narrative on board, our own educational communities
might learn to avoid some common kinds of objectifying relationships. We would
not position students in opposition to other students by treating them as means to
some end, particularly by focusing on intentions. Rather than focus on intentions,
we would concern ourselves with building right relationships in our educational
communities and out of these expect surprising developments, ones that we could
celebrate. We would not subject students to an endless stream of goals and
objectives constructed without reference to individual interests and abilities,
outcomes constructed to pit the members of the community in hopeless, binary
opposition, the “losers” and the “winners”, those who “achieve” and those who “fail”.
We would rather aim for what is essentially the individual success of every member
in terms that are appropriate to each member. Failure would not be an option. It
simply wouldn’t be “thinkable”.
Encouragment
In educational communities like the prophet’s, encouragement is possible
even in extreme cases. Facing his own personal, physical death, one of the rabbis in
the Seer’s community was told by the Seer that he should get ready to die, but the
prophet spoke to him encouragingly, in spite of the bad report about his coming
demise. The result was that the man lived. We can take this on in our communities,
speaking life to situations, rather than simply reiterating what is only obvious by
174
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casual observation. Here Foucault’s political problem represented by “the gaze” is
overcome.175 Scrutiny does not stand in this case since intention (our intention
relative others) is not the focus. In the absence of objectification, the members of
our communities won’t have to be made aware that they are objects being
scrutinized.

Conclusion
The possibilities I have discussed here lead back to questions about the
merits of the discussion. Is it really possible to build educational communities like
the prophet’s? This question seems to turn on the pivotal assumption in Buber’s
novel, the ontological orientation vis-à-vis turning, teshuvah. Turning orients the
prophet. It sets the essential themes in motion. Turning orients the community so
as to make it attentive, caring, joyful, lighthearted, open to the surprising and
miraculous, ready for the unintended, zealous, and embracing powerlessness, not
focused on intention. The Prophet addresses this idea of turning, referring to the
repentance of Joseph’s brethren in the Biblical narrative. We can interpret this as a
call to repentance in our educational communities. Here we may be depicted as
needing to confess that we bear guilt in connection with the problems that we reify
in our communities. As the prophet puts it, can the educational community say, “We
are true men? If so, it would be untrue.”176 The prophet develops this further:
[The prophet] once asked Rabbi David: 'What can man do to cause the
world to be redeemed?’ And his answer was : 'Look, as long as the
brothers of Joseph said to him: We are true men, he thrust them from
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him in anger. But when they confessed: ‘Yes, we are verily guilty
concerning our brother, he had compassion upon them.' This didn't
content the [prophet]. He said, "Yes, so it is. But that is not the whole.
There still remains a mystery.177
It would appear that we must begin with repentance if we are to take on the
Prophet’s assumptions and ways of building community. This will have to involve
our turning to one another, since that it what is essential in repentance. But there
are questions that remain. There is yet a mystery, as the prophet puts it. And there
are voices unlike the prophet’s, critical voices which must be given a hearing. This is
my goal in the next chapter, to bring in the voices that are critical of the prophet’s
approach to building educational communities. Buber anticipates these voices in his
novel. I hope to access the criticism that he anticipated, drawing on conversations
in the novel among members of other communities antagonistic to the prophet’s
community in Pshycha, particularly critical of the prophet himself. With these in
mind, I will make spaces for the perspectives of other scholars critical of Buber’s
ideas in For the Sake of Heaven.
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CHAPTER IV Doubts
Introduction
I have come to the point in the dissertation at which I want to consider any
criticism of Buber’s work in For the Sake of Heaven. Before I proceed, I want to lay
out the kinds of criticism of which I am aware. Since Buber’s work beyond this text
is quite extensive, I will not be able to consider every possible criticism of his
philosophy. Only that which bears directly on this text will be addressed.
The first kind of criticism of the novel is historic. It questions the accuracy of
the historical representation upon which Buber builds his work.
Second, there is the type of criticism which strikes at the work at a very deep
level. This kind of critical approach involves deep level narrative criticism of the
type that questions ontological assumptions.
A third type of criticism of the work, perhaps as powerful, involves criticism
of the kind of community Buber seems to be espousing in the novel. Essentially, this
kind of criticism questions whether educational communities should be imagined
with more “rigor”, with an eye towards effectiveness relative the attainment of
stated goals, i.e., relative stated curriculum. It is essentially an attack of relational
ways of being and knowing, against relational ontology and epistemology.
The fourth type of criticism involves a number of logically fallacious attacks,
such as ad hominem. I include them to consider the nature of criticism in a larger
context. Not every kind of criticism is legitimate.
Essentially then, there seem to be four kinds of complaints about the novel,
only three of which deserve much attention, first that it misrepresents historical
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characters and events, second that it is ontologically flawed, third that the ways of
knowing Buber is espousing are false. The final category involving logical fallacy
will be addressed since it is considered importantly in Buber’s novel.

Historical Criticism
Let me move first to the criticism involving the historical reliability of
Buber’s text. This criticism came early on the heels of the novel’s publication, from a
colleague of Buber’s. It questions the accuracy of the representation of historical
characters in the novel, particularly of the Hasidic rabbis represented.
Gershom Scholem accuses Buber of selecting aspects of Hasidism to confirm
his own philosophical leaning, existentialism. Scholem argues that the “emphasis on
particulars and the concrete that Buber so admired does not exist in Hasidism and
that Buber’s erroneous impressions derive from his attention to oral material and
personalities at the expense of theoretical texts.”178 Essentially, Scholem criticizes
Buber for relying on Hasidic tales at the expense of Hasidic doctrine.179 Buber’s
response to this was that he would not be interested in Hasidism were Scholem’s
criticisms correct.180 As for Buber’s apparent preference for narrative material over
legal material, this will be discussed shortly.
A similarly interesting criticism comes concerning the historical character
represented by Buber as the Prophet in For the Sake of Heaven. Alan Brill says that
Buber portrayed Rabbi Yaakov Yitzhak ben Asher of Pryzsucha (1766-1814),
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originator of Polish Hasidism, as opposed to rabbinic tradition. He observes that the
Rabbi was the successor of Rabbi David Tevel Schiff, a great Talmudist and that the
Rabbi was known as the leader of the exile, implying his position as a legal
scholar.181 Another Jewish scholar suggests that Buber patterned Rabbi Yaakov
Yitzhak ben Asher (the prophet in the novel) after the New Testament character,
Jesus.182 Buber’s response to this was that any resemblance to Jesus was owed to
the fact that the character in the novel as he was portrayed actually shared some
traits with the founder of Christianity.183
Buber was interested in certain aspects of Hasidism more than in others, to
be sure, but his interest was developed in more than forty years of research during
which time he collected Hasidic tales. He paid attention to Hasidic tales and in them
gleaned evidence of the lives of various Hasidic communities.184 To dismiss his
interpretations because they pay less attention to legal, scholarly material than to
other kinds of narratives seems an unnecessary reaction. Furthermore, this
criticism seems disingenuous, not actually paying attention to Buber’s text. There is
no indication in the novel that the Prophet is treated as an antinomian, antagonistic
to legal texts. He is portrayed as attentive to the law of Judaism, but rather more
aware of its being situated relationally, in communities. Appealing to more
relational ways of being and knowing, he is depicted as respectful of traditional
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Jewish texts but opposed to the manipulation of educational communities using
them.
These kinds of critiques open up the topic of historical criticism. In what
sense should authors of historical fiction be held accountable regarding the
characters and events they portray? Is there some limit regarding the interweaving
of historical fact and historical fiction represented in these kinds of works? In what
sense could or should an author be held accountable for twisting or ignoring the
facts of history, resulting in distortion which should undermine his or her
credibility? Questions like this are addressed by Carla Visser as follows:
Whereas the historian's role is, first and foremost, to explain the past,
to make it understandable in terms of today's norms and values,
fiction can create meaningful "realities" that people may never
perceive otherwise, and even bring about changes in our conventional
attitudes toward the world. The historical fiction of Rudy Wiebe's The
Temptations of Big Bear and George Bowering's Burning Water not
only brings the past to life, but it succeeds in changing our
interpretation of it. By telling an "other side" of Canadian history, one
that has not found its way into the accepted world view of White
historiography, Wiebe achieves more or less the same effect as does
Bowering by parodying the conventions of historical and realist
fiction. Both provoke the reader's awareness of the omnipresence of
historical and cultural conditions and of the need to look beyond the
conventionalized perceptions of reality, beyond, that is, the apparent
objectivity, representativity, and unchangeability of stories.185
Hayden White, author of Metahistory186, also points to these concerns in an
essay published in 1980, in which he reminds us that the use of narrative is a way to
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meaning that the mere reporting of history cannot convey.187 He pointed to possible
alternative approaches to telling stories involving historical characters and events.
On the one hand is a “discourse that openly adopts a perspective that looks out on
the world and reports it”. On the other is the “discourse that feigns to make the
world speak itself and speak itself as a story.”188 White, contemporary of Derrida
and Foucault, suggested that historical narrative “imposes a mythic structure on the
events it purports to describe” rather than “revealing the true essence of past
reality.”189 But White did not claim to be a poststructuralist, “denying the reality of
evidence and historical facts.”190 I point to him to engage questions concerning
history and the ways that it can be communicated in narratives like Buber’s novel.
Historical fiction, in any case, becomes an opportunity to play with what are
presented as the facts of history, to point to truths which otherwise remain invisible.
It is a postmodern way of questioning objectivity and the representation of facts
from hegemonic perspectives.
The question regarding historicity is not a small one. Consequently, there is
not space to address it adequately here. I intend to come back to this issue in
chapter five in the recommendations section. That said, while problems associated
with revisionist history deserve attention, my goal here is to consider Buber’s text
philosophically. The depiction of characters and events in the novel are not
presented by Buber as factual, only loosely based on known history, although it has
187
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been demonstrated that Buber used the texts of Hasidism in the way that they were
used by Hasidic rabbis, in the style of the Jewish Midrash191, incorporating elements
in a larger narrative to teach a truth.192 For the Sake of Heaven is not a historical
text. And it can be argued that Buber does not seem to have had the goal of
deliberately twisting the texts so that known historical characters are maligned or
used for nefarious propaganda purposes. There is no holocaust denial here; nor is
there anti-Semitism. Those are the kinds of concerns that become red flags in this
question regarding the historicity of historical fiction.193

Ontological Criticism
There is another kind of criticism of Buber’s novel, one that involves deep
narrative attacks of the material. Ontology lies deep in any philosophy since it
involves assumptions. This is why a critique of the ontological assumptions in
Buber’s novel becomes so important and potentially so effective. Once the
ontological foundation is troubled, the whole philosophical structure might be put in
jeopardy.
Other Narratives
One type of this kind of criticism involves the telling of other narratives
which counter the narrative in consideration. Buber points to this kind of criticism
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in his novel in several places. One example involves the Seer’s assertion that God
uses evil to accomplish his purposes. This kind of narrative is meant to challenge
the prophet’s perspective, that whereas God may indeed “use evil”, humans should
not. This is a direct challenge to the Seer’s assumption that the Hasidic community
should be involving itself in the elevation of Napoleon Bonaparte, in an effort to
manipulate the coming of the Messiah. Buber puts it succinctly:
God may, Rabbi. God can use all things, seeing that nothing can
prevail against Him. But the good…I do not mean God's good…I mean
the good that exists on earth, mortal good - if it seeks to make use of
evil, it drowns in that evil; unnoticeably and without noticing it itself,
it is dissolved in the evil and exists no longer.194
In another place, the Seer asserts that God will make the work of the Hasidic
community effective in relation to Napoleon’s success by using the story of Jacob’s
wrestling with the angel.
Jacob endured wrestling with the angel and was thus prepared against
Esau's weapons. He whose hip the Divine Hand has dislocated
trembles no more before the power of the lords of the earth's peoples.
Sabbath rejoicing means we endure His dreadfulness by virtue of our
love. Lame but inviolable do we issue forth from His hands.195
The Seer chooses the narrative to challenge the Prophet’s lack of interest in
manipulating the wars of Napoleon. However, the ontological truth that the Prophet
understands is that people are not saved from the wars of Gog and Magog by
treating people as objects. These wars are God’s concern and the Prophet
understands that they are not to be manipulated. He understands that people
should not imagine they will be protected from harm that comes through
manipulation. The prophet understands that those who are manipulating others
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should not imagine that they are thereby made inviolate, protected as if by magic
from any damage as a result of their manipulation. Manipulation in communities is
always damaging, since it is objectifying.
Levinas’ Ontological Criticism
There is another criticism of Buber’s ontology found in the works of
Emmanuel Levinas. Buber’s idea of God is critiqued by the postmodernist Levinas,
yet not to dismiss the idea but only to argue for an ontological shift. Buber argues
that God is not a wholly transcendent other, but rather closer to each person than
his or her own self.196 For Buber, God cannot be known apart from His relation to
humans. Buber interprets religious texts like the Bible as the history of God’s
relation to man from the perspective of man. The Bible is essentially the record of a
conversation for Buber, the conversation between God and people. God does not
change through the texts for Buber. It is the theophany, the human experience of
God, that changes. Buber calls this approach tradition criticism, emphasizing
experiential truth and concerning itself with historical themes, in contrast to source
criticism, concerned with verifying textual accuracy.197
Levinas argues that God in Buber’s I-Thou relation is made lower than He
is.198 He believes that a symmetric I-Thou relation is not possible,199 that it reifies
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sameness and pays no attention to difference.200 But this is contested among some
scholars who suggest that Buber is not espousing an objectification of the other
which diminishes it, but is merely proposing an openness to the other, to whatever
the other is or wishes to be.201
Levinas’ concern that relations must be asymmetric seems out of place,
furthermore, given a careful read of Buber’s novel. It does not seem to be Buber’s
intention to reduce the characters in his novel to sameness. The description of the
educational community under the direction of the Prophet involves the deliberate
acknowledgement of the Prophet’s extraordinary abilities and stature in his
community. It also involves the characterization of the Prophet’s community as
imperfect, involving objectification, but not situated on it philosophically.
Descriptions of the Prophet’s educational community point to the Prophet’s
interest and ability to open himself up to the possibilities of others, whatever they
might be. He is depicted as not interested in controlling the situations surrounding
these encounters.
What Buber refers to elsewhere as “true meetings” are encounters between
an individual and an other, without reference to intention. The problem of
objectifying the other as “the same” is actually made to be a non-issue, since
objectification is not the intent at all. It does not enter into the discussion of the
encounter in any way. Rather, objectification (as from one height to another) is the
problem that is overcome in Buber’s account of things.
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Overcoming this problem is what turning implies. One might turn to God as
easily as one might turn to a person. To neither encounter would one bring
knowledge that objectifies the other.
So then the problem with Levinas’ criticism is that the encounter he imagines
between an individual and an other is already asymmetric because it involves
objectification of the other even before the encounter takes place. That is, the other
for Levinas is conceived of in terms of difference. Masquerading as ethical concern
for the other, made possible by the knowledge of the other as different (for Levinas),
the Levinasian relation is actually an objectification of the other and the process is
not unlike the approach to any thing that can be so imagined.
The Levinasian ontological position here is that the relation to others is
always objective, lending itself as well to objectivist epistemology. Things that are
taught would appear to be for Levinas things that are objectively derived from a
source that may be determined in terms of difference.
Levinas’ position relative to Buber seems to ignore what Buber espouses in
his idea of turning. The act of turning is not an objective thing; it is not conceived as
something intentional, to do or be something, or to be an object of an action or of
another person or thing. That is, in turning one does not position oneself to do or be
anything in particular, in relation to the other to which one turns. This is what
makes turning relational and not objectifying. Whether the one to whom one turns
is infinitely or only finitely above or below one makes no difference, since this
observation is not available to the one who is turning. Turning to God is in this
context just like turning to any other person or thing. And this speaks nothing about
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the actual height of God in relation to man, or of the difference to which Levinas is
trying to point. Difference, it seems, is observable only when people are objectified.

Epistemological Criticism
There is another kind of complaint concerning Buber’s ideas in For the Sake
of Heaven. This involves concern regarding epistemology, the assumptions that are
made regarding the nature of knowledge. These are questions about the ways that
people come to knowledge. In what ways do people arrive at knowledge? The
overwhelmingly common assumption is that truth is determined by objective
analysis. This is objectivism. It manifests itself in schools in the form of ideas about
curriculum, concerns about what specific things must be taught, learned and
performed in educational communities.
The literature on stated curriculum is ubiquitous. There seems to be a
never-ending stream of commentary on the question of stated, intentional
curriculum, without the slightest bit of attention given to the question as to its
necessity or validity. That it is necessary and valid is generally assumed. Stated
curriculum seems to be the holy grail of educational praxis. We do want to be in
control! Is stated curriculum necessary, fundamentally? I will consider some
philosophers and educators who think it is essential, and then balance these views
with some who do not.
In general, complaints about Buber’s conceptions of educational
communities arise out of an objectivist epistemology, that knowledge is acquired
deliberately, indirectly or directly, by observation of the environment. Knowledge is
situated as something to be held at arm’s length as it were, to be possessed as an
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object. Freud’s statement regarding knowledge about things that are real is
illustrative. He averred that the only things that were real could be touched, tasted,
seen, smelled or heard, and that it was an illusion to assume anything to the
contrary. 202 This is the reductionist assumption of a materialist, not derived
logically but only asserted and impossible to prove. Its implication, since knowledge
is situated as objective and all things are considered in material terms, is that the
entirety of knowledge can be described, listed and learned.
The objectification of knowledge leads to the development of stated
curriculum and to the expenditure of vast amounts of energy in the development
and adoption of stated curriculum. Whole departments of education are given over
to the task of considering and developing stated curriculum, lists which detail
everything that is supposed to be learned and taught in schools. Stated curriculum
is considered to lie at the core of education and instruction is widely considered in
terms of stated curriculum. There appears to be little worse in most educational
communities than a teacher who is not teaching the stated curriculum or a student
who is not busy paying attention to it, doing the things it says must be done. The
expected disposition of both teacher and student is to be ever ready to explore the
curriculum, that every activity and thought be given to the attainment of stated
objectives. The broad ranging and specific levels of stated curriculum may include
the following:203
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•
•
•

System/society/nation/state (or macro) level
School/institution (or meso) level
Individual/personal (or nano) level

Curriculum is conceived of in the same text as “a long and cyclic process with
many stakeholders and participants; in which motives and needs for changing the
curriculum are formulated; ideas are specified in programs and materials; and
efforts are made to realize the intended changes in practice.”204
Curriculum is conceived as spelling out the details, generally and specifically
of what is supposed to be going on in educational communities, including both the
learning and the teaching, as to content as well as to method. Curriculum involves
“all [the] planned learning outcomes for which [a] school is responsible...[It] refers
to the desired consequences of instruction.”205 It is said to involve “all the learning
which is planned and guided by the school, whether it is carried on in groups or
individually, inside or outside the school.”206 John Dewey said that curriculum was
“a continuous reconstruction, moving from the child’s present experience out into
that represented by the organized bodies of truth that we call studies…the various
studies…are themselves experience.”207 Robert Gagne said that curriculum is a
“sequence of content units arranged in such a way that the learning of each unit may
be accomplished as a single act, provided the capabilities described by specified
prior units (in the sequence) have already been mastered by the learner.”208 D. F.
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Brown said that curriculum included “all student school experiences relating to the
improvement of skills and strategies in thinking critically and creatively, solving
problems, working collaboratively with others, communicating well, writing more
effectively, reading more analytically, and conducting research to solve
problems.”209
What is inherent in stated curriculum is the element of control. In every
definition considered here, curriculum is objectified, even when it is made to include
processes and anticipated change, for the processes themselves are planned and are
made to transfer to known tasks and to fit with known expectations. As well, the
conception of change in curriculum theory explored in the definitions above
involves the objectified adjudication of curriculum as appropriate, contextually
responsive or culturally relevant. While the intention for change seems laudable,
the structure is still objectivist. Change is had by objectifying knowledge and related
products and processes. Conceptions of curriculum seem to be thoroughly
objectified, cast in stone, if continuously morphed by an objective process. The
implementation of curriculum may be judged by observation, by the assessment of
tasks relative to stated objectives. Given the assumption that what is important in
curriculum can be planned and assessed, the stage is set to negatively critique the
Prophet’s educational community in For the Sake of Heaven.
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Barth’s Epistemological Criticism
There is another objectivist criticism of Buber’s work that comes from a
contemporary of Buber, the German theologian, Karl Barth. In his Church
Dogmatics, Barth critiques Buber’s anthropology, his doctrine of humanity. He
actually puts his criticism of Buber with his criticism of Confucian and atheist
anthropologies, interpreting them as what might be called “natural theology.”210
Whereas Barth defines a human being in terms of his or her belief system, Buber
defines humanity in terms of the encounters that occur among people. What this
means for Barth is that if we are to understand the idea of humanity, we have to
conceive of people first as believers. And we have to understand that right beliefs
are the ground of faith. He says that faith “is what takes place in real knowledge of
the Word of God and makes this knowledge possible.”211 Barth says that the Word
of God can be “the object of acknowledgement and therefore the ground of real
faith” and that people need to be fixed in the faith that is situated in the knowledge
of the Word of God.212 This involves the objectification of the scripture of which
Barth speaks as well as the objectification of faith itself.
What Barth’s criticism seems actually to involve is an attack of Buber’s
epistemology. For Barth, faith and scripture are objects to be grasped. Seen in this
way, this Barthian criticism is another way that Buber’s idea that knowledge is
discoverable in relationships is critiqued.
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Buber does not objectify the Bible or faith. He chooses rather to situate faith
in an experience with others and ultimately with God. The scripture for Buber is a
record of a conversation between God and human beings.213 To get in on this
conversation, one needs to respond to others, to turn to others and by this turn to
God. This view of scripture is contrary to Barth’s view of scripture as the fixed
object of faith. It is also contrary to Barth’s view of faith itself. For Buber, faith is
something that happens between people who turn to one another and by this
turning, turn to God. Scripture as well as faith are interpreted relationally in this
way.214 What this means in Buber’s novel is that relationships in Buber’s
educational community are focused upon and not the actual teachings or the
dialectic positions taken by members of the community. Dialectic is supplanted by
dialogic as the focus of the Prophet’s educational community in the novel. While
ideas are important, they do not situate the community. Rather, the community
situates ideas. Ideas are therefore understood after the fact of relating with others.
Epistemological Criticism from Buber’s Text
Criticism of Buber’s epistemology takes the form in his own novel of
complaints against the Prophet’s community’s approach to teaching and learning.
These complaints come from groups outside this community, as well as from other
Hasidic groups. I include this criticism here to demonstrate Buber’s anticipation of
this kind of critique and to situate criticism of Buber’s ideas more broadly. Buber
does anticipate criticism of the Prophet’s educational community. Some of the types
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of complaints against Buber, taken from his own text, appear in the list below. They
are here in column form with commentary following to assist the reader. The eight
complaints listed below form the kernel of what is an attempt to disparage the
prophet’s lack of interest in what is essentially stated curriculum. These could be
considered complaints against Buber’s epistemology since they are meant to call
into question his approach to the ways that knowledge is acquired.
1. The prophet’s educational community is not focused on intention.
2. His educational community ignores stated curriculum.
3. He was ineffective.
4. It is not realistic.
5. It undermines others and their ways.
Not Focused on Intention
The prophet was accustomed to sending his students on missions without
any objective. Along the way, they would make unexpected discoveries, learning
things in encounters with people along the way. The Seer, on the other hand,
focuses on intention, intending to “risk the decisive attempt” to use his community
to manipulate Napoleon Bonaparte.215 This in itself is a criticism of the way that the
prophet leads his disciples. Buber’s focus was on building right relationships,
without reference to intention. This is due to his ontological assumption that
turning to an other person would predispose a person to learning/experiencing
something that belongs only to that turning. In fact, such a turning would mean that
a person would not be able to carry to the encounter any objective knowledge about
the encounter. This means that the encounter is envisioned as totally open and not
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an objective process at all. This is the precursor to relational epistemology as it is
described in feminist scholarship, that there are ways of knowing that belong to
relationships among people.216
Ignores Curriculum
A similar criticism anticipated by Buber in the novel is that the Prophet
wasted his community’s time on things that were not planned, that he was therefore
unable to do the things the larger community expected. This is essentially a
complaint that the Prophet did not stick to the curriculum. An example is that the
Prophet was uninterested in pursuing the supposedly higher, spiritual aims of the
parent community of Lublin under the direction of the Seer. The Seer offered his
students “knowledge that went beyond the merely human”, wanting to engage them
in a spiritual struggle on behalf of Napoleon.217 Other areas (of curriculum)
neglected by the Prophet include daily communal prayers (preferring to pray
alone)218, sitting at table in the prescribed way (not at the head)219 and participating
in exegetical discussions rather than inviting others to turn to God.220
Ineffective
The lack of focus on intention and the failure to carry out things as
prescribed leads to the charge of ineffectiveness. But the appearance of
ineffectiveness here is only apparent. Given the assumption that the Prophet should
be directing the community into planned, intentional activities, the charge of
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ineffectiveness sticks, but the assumption may be considered to be in error. That is
the whole point of the Prophet’s unique approach to the activities of the members of
his educational community; they focus on the unintentional, on the surprising, and
not on the planned.
Unrealistic
A focus on the unintentional of course will have the appearance of not being
realistic, since expectations don’t appear to match any plans relating to observed
behaviors or to real things in the environment. This is related to the charge that the
Prophet’s way is a pretense, only appearing to do anything valuable yet not really. It
doesn’t appear to espouse any kinds of expectations which mean that the members
of the community should be able to do certain things or would learn specific things,
thus apparently satisfying stated objectives.
Undermines Others
Related to these complaints about the Prophet’s community in Buber’s novel
is the charge that the Prophet’s way of teaching and learning would undermine other
people and the ways in which they contribute to educational communities. If a
person like the Prophet is allowed to lead his disciples without reference to stated
objectives in an established, objective curriculum, this would have a deleterious
effect on other educational communities, or so it would seem. These kinds of
complaints, as they are made to appear in the novel, represent the ways that Buber
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anticipates criticism of the kind of educational community he is espousing in the
novel.221

Informally Fallacious Criticism
There is a fourth kind of criticism, anticipated by Buber in the novel itself. I
consider it here to open up a conversation about the nature of criticism itself. This
criticism involves what are essentially logical fallacies, attempts to critique Buber’s
representation in the novel as immoral. The Prophet’s educational community is
variously characterized as bad for children, deceitful, disrespectful of things and
melancholic.
Bad for Children
The complaint concerning the Prophet’s way of teaching and learning being
bad for children is reminiscent of similar charges being made against Socrates,
though in that case, implications of corruption had a somewhat different import.222
Nevertheless, charges that a philosophical approach to education does not support
and even hinders children have a power of their own, not unlike the power that
charges of actual physical abuse might carry. Education must in every sense serve
students. Charging that it may not be serving students and moreover that it may be
actually harming them is grave indeed.
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There is no evidence to believe that the Prophet’s behavior or omission to do
something in the novel actually harmed anyone. There is just the hint from the Seer,
a subtle attack of the Prophet and his approach to education in which the Seer
references Elijah, the Biblical prophet, who is said to be coming “before the great
and dreadful day of the Lord in order to turn the hearts of the fathers back to the
sons and of the sons back to the fathers.”223 The Seer is wresting scripture,
objectifying it, as it were, to defend his own objectivist approach to education. That
is, the highly esteemed prophet of the Hebrew Bible, Elijah, is situated as having an
agenda at his appearance, that is, to turn the hearts of the fathers back to the sons
and vice versa. And yet the whole point of the prophet’s approach to education is
that the only way to do this is to approach education relationally, and not with an
eye toward intention. It would seem, ironically, that intending to turn people to one
another is the way to turn them inward or upon things or one another as objects.
The Seer’s subtle attack, made so much more effective by the use of text that is
considered sacred, is actually manipulative, in content and in the use of it. Hearts
will never be turned when they feel the weight of implacable intention bearing
down upon them. Whatever would transpire from that would not be a turning. The
charge against the Prophet as manipulative is a gross distortion. The kind of
approach to others he espouses is anything but manipulative. And it is curious that
this charge comes from the mouths of the Seer and his disciples who seek to
manipulate the outcome of the Napoleonic Wars!
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Deceptive
The Prophet was accused by a student of the Seer as an arrogant deceiver,
pretending that he was the Seer himself.224 “Where there is a great light”, said Rabbi
Jehuda, disciple of the Seer, “the powers of darkness gather round about, seeking to
devour it. But how can they approach it in their own dark guise? They must
themselves put on a garment of light. And light is pleasing in the eyes of the
light.”225 This was a direct attack on the Prophet. The Prophet himself denied
trying to usurp anyone’s authority. In fact, his whole intention was to point to the
ways that intention might not be made the focus of his own educational community.
Disrespectful of Things
The Prophet’s generosity is also attacked by the Seer’s disciples as
disrespectful of things. Allowed to use the Seer’s shirt during his absence at one
point, the Prophet made a gift of the shirt to a beggar. This was interpreted as
highly disrespectful of the Seer.226 Of course it was not. It was simply that the
Prophet did not make of the shirt an object to be revered, seeing in the relation with
the beggar the more important thing. He chose the relation with the beggar over the
value of the object. That is only due to his relational way.
Melancholic
A final criticism of the Prophet in Buber’s novel is that the way of the Prophet
is melancholic. The Seer is made to say repeatedly that melancholy is not
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appropriate in educational communities. “Avoid melancholy with all your might. It
hurts the service of God more than sin.”227 This is a telling remark, for it says of sin,
which is basically a kind of refusal to turn to others and ultimately to God, that it is
not as bad as being melancholic. This is the complaint of an objectivist appraising
things. On the surface an educational community may seem happy, but at a deeper
lever people are not attending to one another, turning to one another in open ways.
That this turning might involve at times a certain kind of melancholy is
characteristic of life. Things that happen are not always good. A pie-in-the-sky kind
of temperament does not always serve an educational community well, given
objectivist approaches to curriculum and the life of an educational community.
Claims about happiness in the community might only reflect feelings of fulfilled
expectation. To be sure, people do get a sense of fulfillment when they achieve
stated objectives. Furthermore, that the Prophet’s educational community was
melancholic does not seem to bear up under scrutiny. As I averred in chapter three,
the community seems unusually joyous and high spirited.

Silencing
Another kind of criticism of the ways that the members of the Prophet’s
community learned and taught, as it is made to appear in the novel, involves actual,
outright lying as well as misdirection by insinuation. These arguments are not
attempts to attack ideas or the ways that people relate in the novel. In some senses,
these kinds of attacks might be considered uncharacteristic of philosophical
argumentation, but sordid elements enter into every kind of argument. No human
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argument is without flaw. Informal fallacies abound in human communication.
These particular arguments involve actual fabrication or else deliberate
inattentiveness. The Seer is said to be unable to stop listening to lies about the
prophet, a fact which strikes the prophet “to the heart.”228 These attacks may
involve threats and uncaring comments, for instance, that the members of Buber’s
educational community in For the Sake of Heaven are not in the right field, that is,
that they ought to get out of education. The prophet is told in no uncertain terms,
“This is not the right business for you”, and is forbidden to comment on scripture.229
Short of that, there is as well the disingenuous honoring of the prophet’s
community, a kind of attack by joining. In a bait and switch move, the prophet’s
educational community is honored, only to be invited to force its views on every
other community, thereby potentially undoing itself along with its view towards
unintentional curriculum. Speaking with the prophet, the Seer proclaims how
similar their goals really are, in spite of everything.
We are, all of us, the errant sons of a single Father, some doubtless a
little more foolish than the others, but all so full of failings that the
differences among us are no great matter, nor the little more nor the
little less, sons and brothers as we are.230
This demonstrates how truths that belong to relationships may be objectified
and used to set one’s ideological opponent off balance. The Seer in another place,
all the while feigning repentance, invites others to join him in his quest to
manipulate Napoleon.
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Like yourself I have felt it to be my duty to work with might and main
to the end that he become that Gog concerning whom prophecy
speaks. But it is given to no man to know in what manner the
triumphs and the defeats of this man are allied to redemption. It is
not for us to be partisan on one side or the other. This was not always
my opinion; I have recognized my error. Our only aim must be to see
to it that the density of happenings does not thin out, but become
greater and greater. This is our common task. Each one may cultivate
a special feeling in his heart; the work must be common to us all.231
In such a way political movements are started, with an eye towards the
objectification of this or that person or thing, even of God. And to this task is
marshaled all the groundswell of common feeling. This kind of logically fallacious
attack is perhaps one of the most deadly to human communities, since it has the
appearance on the surface of humility and of usefulness in relation to the common
good. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

Conclusion
I have attempted here in chapter four to explore some of the criticism of
Buber’s work in For the Sake of Heaven. As I have interpreted it, the criticism has
seemed to fall into four categories, including the historical, the ontological, the
epistemological, the logically fallacious and the political. While I have not covered
all possible critical considerations of Buber’s literary corpus (that would be
impossible here), I have considered some of the major criticisms of his work in the
novel.
My intent now is to move to a discussion of the status of things as I see them.
Given the consideration of the implications of Buber’s work in For the Sake of
Heaven, along with an appraisal of the critical readings of Buber’s work in the novel,
231
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I intend to draw some conclusions regarding the implications of the novel. As well, I
would like to point to possible directions future studies might take among scholars
interested in Buber’s work. The question that concerns me now is whether and how
scholarly work on Buber’s ideas presented here can move forward. I also want to
examine the implications of Buber’s ideas presented for our own educational
communities, examining what this means as I consider my own role as an educator
and as an emerging scholar. This involves the question as to the significance of
Buber’s novel in education in general and in the academic community specifically.
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CHAPTER V Synthesis
Introduction
In this chapter I retrace the steps I have taken in the dissertation and
consider where it has taken me. I also want to imagine where a similar journey
might take other students of Buber as well as how this can lead to the development
of new ideas and practices. I want to pay attention to the revisiting of old ideas
about our educational communities as well, reminding the reader that there may
indeed be “nothing new under the sun.”232 Acknowledging the way I have come has
always been contingent, I want to position myself humbly as an emerging scholar
and as an educator pointing a way for others to learn from a narrative of the
unintended, the unplanned and the surprising.

A Disposition
As I look back over the course of my work in the dissertation, I am overwhelmed
with the feeling that the journey has been full of surprises. Feeling as though I were
setting out on a journey to revisit an old friend, I approached Martin Buber’s novel
with the expectation that I was indeed going to be surprised by what I was to
discover, since I was already quite familiar with his work and I had long admired his
wisdom. I just knew that he would pack For the Sake of Heaven with gems it would
take a lifetime to unearth. I suppose that in essence this is an expectation that is not
an expectation. It’s more an expectation that is willing to be surprised. It is willing to
not know the details about what is to come but is happy to wait and see. I am
232
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speaking here of the kind of response that readers of novels have to writers like
Buber who masterfully develop characters. Such readers pay attention to the
details, especially if they understand that the writer is not just the average novelist,
but a world-renowned philosopher. Furthermore, the read is made so much sweeter
when the language is as colorful and astoundingly beautiful as it is in Buber’s
writing. I say this here to position myself more significantly in Buber’s works, not to
invite to my approach to Buber a doubtful, sidelong, reproachful glance, as if my
comment is to be seen as unnecessarily gushing. No. I say this here just to say that I
have really loved reading and gleaning from Buber’s novel. I have actually wanted to
pay attention to it. It has been enjoyable. There is something in all of this I am
saying now, something that points to how we do things as relative to our ontological
and epistemological foundations. What I am pointing to is the idea that our projects
are made so much sweeter when we love what we do by turning to them in
dialogical ways. We can love what we do or whom we are with only when we pay
attention to what we are doing and to whom we are with. But paying attention is
only possible by turning. I feel I have paid attention to Buber’s ideas in For the Sake
of Heaven, and what is more, I have entered into the work, as it were, falling in love
with the character of the prophet in particular. Lest I be framed as unscholarly in
this, I want to position myself in relation to bell hook’s idea that love needs to be
allowed an entry point into scholarly conversations about education.233 So, let me
say without qualification, “I loved doing this work!” And this to me is quite
surprising.
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Looking Back
Chapter One
I set out in chapter one to lay out an agenda.234 I was going to speak of the
plan for the dissertation. Then I intended situating myself in relation to it. I planned
to explore Martin Buber’s background and then address his ideas in Between Man
and Man. It was then my intention to give some reasons why I chose to explore
Martin Buber’s only novel, For the Sake of Heaven. I believe I did those things in
chapter one, but the reasons I approached the novel originally seem to me now
somewhat disingenuous, if true. Of course I wanted to and needed to consider
Buber’s ontological and epistemological ideas developed in Between Man and Man,
but the reasons for this I truly only understand now that the process is complete. I
think rather now that I was drawn to consider Buber’s ontology and epistemology
for the very reason that I needed to be surprised. I want to come back to this idea
again, with recommendations regarding educator ontological positioning and stated
curriculum. The idea and experience of surprise needs to be incorporated into a
more flexibly imagined curriculum. Sometimes, ironically, this only happens with
hindsight.
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Chapter Two
Chapter two was where I paid attention to Buber’s novel in a very deliberate,
planned way. I spent inordinate amounts of time reading and re-reading the novel,
then recording and sorting data I gathered in the novel. I began to understand that
the character of the prophet represented Buber, so I knew I had to pay close
attention to that character’s ontological assumptions, as well as to his way of
relating to others in the novel.
I paid attention to the historical context of the novel as well as to historical
characters Buber was representing, as well as to the way that Buber narrativized the
characters. I developed ideas concerning the prophet’s ontological grounding,
addressing his basic anthropology and theology in connection with ideas about God
and humanity. This entailed exploring the prophet’s assumptions about turning as
the way that people relate with other people and even with God. I noted the
prophet’s assumptions regarding the Shechinah, God’s manifest Presence that
dwells in the world. Beginning to expect the way that ontological foundations fed
into epistemology, I began noticing the prophet’s modus operandi, a focus on the
unintentional and his assumption that the most worthy goal of his own community
was to pursue right relationships with others rather than rights. This lead in chapter
two to a focus on the epistemological assumptions of the prophet. I began taking
note as to the prophet’s ideas about the nature of knowledge, observing the prophet
speak of it as response, as limited, and as suffering.
As I consider the intention I brought to chapter two, I am surprised by the
reasons I gave, just as I was regarding my intentions relative to chapter one. Of
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course I needed to do everything I set out to do. It seemed abundantly clear to me
that ontology and epistemology needed to be addressed. I understood the
foundational importance of these branches of philosophy. I knew how critical they
were in philosophical argument and that ideological attacks in terms of ontology
and epistemology could be shattering. I had to explore these issues, just as a
philosopher. They interested me academically. But now that I look back over the
work, I sense that I was being lead into something I could not have anticipated. I was
being taken into a world in which ontological assumptions are embraced and
celebrated. In this world to which Buber was leading me, I was being made to
witness the lives of individuals who admitted and embraced a complex ontology. It
was a world of believers. While the details of the assumptions were not made to
appear to be set in stone, they nevertheless were made to become the very air that
this Hasidic community breathed. In a sense, I was being shown how to breathe. I
think one does that ontologically. That is, without an ontological foundation that is
lived and not just expressed philosophically, I cannot understand how I can ever
really live! Buber has taken me to a place I could not have anticipated. There was
no plan for it. But this willingness to pay attention to questions of ontology in the
context of a Hasidic novel has changed the way I see things. Ontologically, it is like a
new birth.
Chapter Three
I set out to “play the believing game” in chapter three. I wanted to take
Buber’s work seriously, suspending disbelief in an effort to give him a fair hearing. I
understood that it was essential to imagine how Buber’s ideas as they were
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embodied in the life of the prophet needed to be applied in real contexts. The
surprising realization came to me that Buber had already done the essential work.
Right before me in the novel itself was a community which was living out its
ontological and epistemological foundations. So I intended to examine the roles of
the prophet and his disciples, using Buber’s novel to describe how a community
taking on the ontological and epistemological foundations of the prophet might
appear.
Descriptions of the prophet’s community were detailed. I discussed the
possibility of an educational community in which students were loyal, willing to
serve, joyful, humble and ready for the unintended. I began to see that educators in
such a community would be willing to cooperate with others, not positioning
themselves as experts looking down upon lower level students. I noticed that
participation in such communities would not be compulsory. It was delightful to
observe that the focus of such communities would not be upon intention. Nor would
the focus be upon power dynamics as one member played against other members
for domination. Such communities would be relationally focused, intent upon
developing right relationships with people and not upon grasping at rights. I
observed that such communities would orient themselves humbly. Educators would
not see their roles as duties to fulfill but as interesting relations to which they are
drawn. They would be generous, giving of themselves, of their time and energy. Not
taking the easy road of forming communities based on common interests alone, they
would embrace the oppositional, since making ideas dependent upon communities,
and not vice-versa, accommodates that. I saw that in every instance, such a
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community would be encouraging, since it could be in every case, since the focus
was on relationships and not on effectiveness.
The reasons I gave for imagining an educational community that took on the
prophet’s ontological and epistemological assumptions were good reasons. I
understood that this was doing Buber justice. I needed to consider his ideas in real
contexts so they might be critiqued. But what I did not realize was that I was being
taken by Buber into a world where people got along just fine without planning
everything. I was made to stand by, wondering at this or that surprising moment as
disciples were sent on missions without goals, just to see what might happen. I
think I needed to be surprised and that is perhaps the real reason I was drawn to this
novel. Moreover, I needed to see that it was possible and even okay to live in a
world where everything is not regimented. I needed also to witness and imagine a
world in which fundamental assumptions are embraced and are made overt.
Chapter Four
There were more surprises in store for chapter four. I intended giving an ear
to criticisms of Buber’s ideas as I was developing them in the analysis of For the
Sake of Heaven. That was my intent. This is what I did. However, what came of this
was much more than I anticipated. I began the chapter looking at some historical
questions. I wondered what it meant for a writer to take persons from history and
then construct a world around them. I was asking questions about historical fiction.
That opened up a fascinating problem, one which I do not believe I adequately
addressed. I will return to that in the recommendations section, later on in this
chapter.
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Besides the historical problems, I knew there were going to be problems
concerning the ontological assumptions Buber embodied in his character, the
prophet. The surprising thing to me was that the novel itself opened up to me as
anticipating these kinds of (ontological) criticisms. Buber was showing me how the
problems with his ontology might be considered by providing examples of other
kinds of narratives which could be used to attack his assumptions.
Emmanuel Levinas’ criticism of Buber struck at an extremely deep level,
attacking his idea of God as well as his basic idea of dialogical relationality. Calling
attention to difference, Levinas pointed out that Buber’s dialogical relation entailed a
symmetry which could not be true. He attempted demonstrating this by pointing to
God as wholly other and at others as radically other. He said that Buber’s relation
made God less than He is. He used the same idea to situate others in asymmetric
relations, seemingly contradicting Buber’s ontology. The surprising consequence of
my paying attention to Levinas’ argument was that I began to see that the argument
was essentially objectivist, that Levinas was already implicating himself in
objectivism by insinuating difference in a relation. People entering the moments of
true Buberian dialogue do not bring to it assumptions about others.
Similarly, my analysis of Karl Barth’s criticism of Buber’s epistemology led to
surprising results. Barth’s contention that we have to look at people as believers
first was his attempt to detract from the attention Buber gave to others on their own
terms. I discovered that Buber’s epistemology situates ideas as dependent upon
educational communities, in real contexts. Ideas that swing free of contexts are not
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Buber’s focus. But this is not what became so surprising to me. That was yet to
come.
I expected that criticism of Buber’s epistemology could come from the field of
curriculum and educational theory. I looked at some of the literature on stated
curriculum and noticed that it involved a level of control of the type that would be
loathsome to the prophet in Buber’s novel. I recall the reaction I had to the
prophet’s observation that Lublin smelled of effectiveness. I could hardly stop
laughing. What was so surprising to me was that I could not have had this experience
other than through a read of Buber’s novel. It brought me to this wonderful
community which grew up around the prophet and it showed me that it was
possible to live with others in educational communities and to let go of control.
Buber anticipated criticism of his ontology and epistemology. It became
apparent to me as I dissected and reconstituted data on the prophet’s community in
For the Sake of Heaven. He expected that the character of the prophet, along with
his educational community, would be criticized for not focusing on intention, for
ignoring curriculum, for being ineffective and unrealistic, as well as for undermining
other educational communities. It was that first criticism, concerning intention, that
surprised me the most. It seemed such a deep level criticism, I was immediately
struck by its absolute importance ontologically. This, I think , is perhaps the most
profound discovery I have made in this analysis of Buber’s novel. The unseating of
intention as the ground of being in educational communities is absolutely
astounding. Intentional acts seem to be the holy grail of academic pursuits.
Everything is made to seem to have to do with intention. But the dethroning of
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intention in an educational community’s ontological stance seems a project worthy
of attention. There is more to say about this in the upcoming recommendations
section.
I noticed an interesting kind of criticism of Buber’s ontology and
epistemology, anticipated in the novel. Involving logical fallacies, it includes charges
that the kind of educational community the prophet was part of was bad for
children, deceptive, disrespectful of things and melancholic. There was even ad
hominem involving direct lies and threats that the prophet should not even speak.
To my mind, this kind of illogical attack is part and parcel of what it means to live in
communities that are built on the wrong ontological and epistemological
foundations. Buber has helped me imagine that it is possible to build upon more
sure foundations.
I explored Martin Buber’s novel, For the Sake of Heaven, with the intention of
the analysis and application of findings to imagined educational communities. I
have explored problems related to this and have come away with a better
understanding of the issues. Moreover, the awareness that important things are not
always apparent and that their discovery seems to be possible only in unplanned,
unintended events was for me a kind of performance of the narrative itself. The
more important result of the work involved in the dissertation was the embrace of
the narrative. I believe I responded to it existentially. I was given a chance to live
out Martin Buber’s narrative in a sense, experiencing the surprising effect involved
when one embraces the unintentional. This felt to me like a gift.
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Looking Forward
Embrace the Unintentional
With a similar process involving unintended results in mind, the next
question concerns the possibilities inherent in taking this stance relative to things
that are unplanned and unintended. On the face of it, this question seems a
tantalizing irony. That is, how is one supposed to take a stance in relation to
something that is not even on the visible horizon? Aren’t stances in themselves
supposed to be attitudes and dispositions in relation to issues, conditions and
realities that are known? How could taking a stance relative the unintentional even
be imagined? How could an educator, for instance, take a stance regarding the
embrace of the unintentional regarding curriculum? This is a troubling question,
especially in light of concerns about stated curriculum, addressed in chapter four.
I do not recommend that things that are planned need to be ignored, nor that
the act of planning ought to be considered altogether subversive. Nor do I think
Buber would recommend similar action. As was shown in chapter 3, Buber was not
setting up a false dichotomy vis-à-vis the prophet and the Seer. The prophet was
made to say that he owed much to the Seer, even though he did not subscribe to his
view of the manipulation of Napoleon Bonaparte. We, like the prophet, live in a
material world. We must interact with things and people objectively. Observation,
the gathering of data, its analysis and application are part and parcel of the
mechanism that clothes and feeds us. These are ways of interacting with things and
people that are objectifying. Were we to abandon them, it is certain that disease,
starvation, rapid societal breakdown and even death would occur. It would not be
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wise to advocate the abandonment of all things that are objectifying. In that case, I
should not have written this dissertation nor bothered reading anything other
scholars have written, since all of that would involve objectification of the material.
I do not advocate the wholesale abandonment of planning among educators.
I have been a teacher for more than twenty years and I do understand the value of
planning. Without structure of some kind it would be impossible to have meetings
with people. There are considerations like time which constrain us. Are we going to
meet at ten o’clock or at half past five? This involves objectification, since time is
treated as an object. That is, the intention of the meeting is that it begin at such and
such a time. Other things, like location are also things that become objects for us.
While I do not recommend ignoring intention altogether, I recommend that it
ought not be situated as the place where we live. By that I mean that intention does
not need to govern everything that we do in our educational communities. We need
to learn to let go of control at times, just abandoning ourselves to the possibility that
we might experience the feeling of being led by something or someone we cannot
describe and may only assume to be real or important, something or someone
nevertheless, with tremendous ontological significance. This kind of willingness to
be led by the unknown leads to another consideration.
Choose the Place Where You Live and Breathe
Do I recommend that all educators should adopt Martin Buber’s ontology as
it appears in For the Sake of Heaven? I do not, though it is a possibility worthy of
attention. I would point rather to the possibility that people in educational
communities might begin to embrace their own ontological narratives and bring
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them forward, making them overt and not hidden. An ontology is the elephant in
the room of which few want to speak. It is the structure which gives support to
every kind of philosophical force, undergirding thereby every kind of thought and
action imaginable. Exposing any particular ontology becomes increasingly
important particularly when it is a structure supporting oppressive hegemony.
Educators need to be aware of the ontological narratives that are in themselves
antithetical to dialogical processes which are liberating. We need as well to take
note of the ontologies which cause our communities to flourish in dialogically
relational ways.
As I said earlier in this chapter, embracing ontology is like breathing. It’s our
life’s blood, oxygenating all our systems. Seen in another way, it’s where we live.
We need to express what we assume to be true among ourselves, paying attention to
one another’s words, aware that objectivist criticism of ontological positions is
logically fallacious. While this is true, we need to be aware that nothing that we
assume to be true is so sacrosanct it is impervious to criticism, to the kind of
relationally situated, dialogic criticism that is an aspect of Buberian dialogical
relations.
Ontologies are like houses situated in city neighborhoods along tree-lined
streets with sidewalks to accommodate passersby . People walking by might speak
of the house where a person lives in terms of its appearance and overall condition.
Issues might be raised concerning the life of the house, how long it has been in the
particular spot, whether it has been remodeled or is in swift decline, or whether it is
fit for habitation. Concerns might come from neighbors who complain about the
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overall effect the particular house is having on property values and so on. This is
the way it is with ontologies for us. Like houses, they can be critiqued by casual
observers. This brings to mind a story Leo Buscaglia once told of his neighbor’s
concern about the leaves in his (Buscaglia’s) yard. To the neighbor, the leaves were
an eyesore, but to Buscaglia, they were remarkably beautiful. With graduate
students help, Buscaglia promptly went out to his lawn, put all the leaves in large
bags and brought them into his house, pouring them on the floor of his living room,
at the feet of his befuddled graduate students. From Buscaglia’s perspective, this
was the solution that made both parties happy, his neighbor and himself.235
Casual observers can make excellent observations of ontological positions,
but objectivist critique that comes to them is a fallacy. The principle here is kind for
kind. Ontological structures can be dismantled or, short of that, reformed, using
other ontological structures. Assumptions cannot be disproven using appeals to
logic, except in terms of other assumptions. It is true that some assumptions are
better than other ones, but not by virtue of anything that can be proven, only by
virtue of the seeming soundness of a contrary assumption. Trying to take down an
ontology with a bit of data or with an observation derived on the basis of an
opposing ontology is a bit like trying to take down the sky using a toothpick. The
logical fallacy here involves a category error.
Ontologies are structures that cannot be brought down by casual
observation. Like houses which remain unaffected by casual comments of
passersby, ontologies will always survive objective critique. Ontological positions
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Leo F. Buscaglia, Love (Thorofare, N.J.,: C. B. Slack, 1972).
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are deep. The structures of ontologies will only be dismantled when forces are in
place which have equal weight. That is, one cannot minimize the effect of an
ontological position by analytical critique. It will only be affected by something of
the same category, by another ontology. This is like the dismantling of a house.
Things are brought in that have a relatively equal weight in relation to the house,
like bulldozers, sledge hammers and pry bars, along with less weighty but powerful,
less damaging things like screwdrivers and hammers. It goes without saying, of
course, that things like these are allowed in a person’s house only with the
permission of the homeowner. No comment ever made by a casual passerby will
ever dismantle a house. But when permission is given, home remodeling is possible.
Ontologies are subject to modification, indeed. But just as the prophet observed in
the novel, try dismantling a person’s assumptions like the existence of God without
permission and care and you will be shown the door.
People in educational communities need to be aware of their assumptions
and to make them known. They need to occupy the houses they are in, proclaiming
to every passerby with unapologetic joy, “This is where I live!” Educational
communities need to open up spaces where ontologies can be mined, as it were.
Perhaps this is akin to the discovery of gold deposits in someone’s backyard. As we
talk together, visiting one another’s houses, we may discover things about the places
where we live that are altogether lovely and indeed, surprising. But never should
one bring to one’s visits to neighbors’ houses uncaring and objectivist criticism, a
mean-spirited lack of appreciation for the beauty that one’s neighbor sees, even if
one does not.
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What of the possibility that the house of one’s neighbor is filled with hatred?
What if the ontology that seems to be embraced by the other is evil? How is one to
enter the house of that other whose ontology is dark and hateful? This issue was
addressed in chapter one of the dissertation, involving Buber’s discussion of the
idea of good and evil. The discussion of this issue involves the definition of evil
itself. For Buber, the term evil is not useful as a descriptor of a person. No one is
essentially evil for Buber. No one inherently wants to do evil. Such an idea is selfcontradictory for Buber. He develops this further in his text, Good and Evil, cited in
chapter two. Evil is the tendency in every person to turn away from an other; the
ultimate expression of this for Buber is turning away from God, the logical extension
of otherness.
So how is one to approach an other whose ontology is evil? The way is by
turning to that other. In dialogical relations, the other is protected against the
oppression of an objectivist approach. This works for the good as well as for the evil.
Taking a dialogical stance does not mean that in the hard cases one can decide to
take an objectivist approach to an other, treating him or her as an object. One does
not get to take to a dialogical relation an assumption about the other, nor any other
assumptions regarding possible realities or outcomes. Does this mean that opening
oneself up to an other whose ontological position is evil may bring suffering? Yes, it
does. But this is the price of redemption at times. Every kind of evil can be changed.
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If not, all that is left is an eventual nihilism, the embrace of meaninglessness. In that
case, evil triumphs and the good is an hypocrisy.236
How could teachers begin bringing their own ontological grounding forward?
To begin, colleges and universities need to imagine curriculum that addresses this
concern. Philosophers need to play significant roles in teacher preparation
programs. Courses need to be designed that explore ontological issues in terms that
are accessible to teacher candidates. I would go further and recommend that
courses should be required of all college and university students which invite them
to consider their own assumptions in a non-threatening atmosphere, even where
the assumptions of academicians are brought forward. The understanding needs to
be maintained throughout that ontological positions are in some senses immune to
objectivist criticism and that any successful challenge of anyone’s ontology will have
to involve another ontology. The message here is that in the end (and in the
beginning,), all we get is a story. And that is entirely an assumption, which grounds
it extremely powerfully. All anyone ever gets in ontology is an assumption.
One last recommendation relative to the preparation of teachers:
storytelling must not be abandoned in our communities. I am aware that narratives
already play a significant role in educational communities. But we need to be aware
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I am not advocating conditions for the wholesale slaughter of the innocents.
There are limits in human encounters which philosophy is ill-disposed to predict or
serve. Reasons are never needed for irrational or non-rational behavior. No one has
ever heard of a “philosophy of irrationality or non-rationality”; that is a
contradiction. That is, irrationality does not respond to reasons. Nor do forces like
rage and fear respond to reason. In the times of rage and fear, dialogical relations
are not possible. They will have to first subside. These are the times of madness, of
turning in on oneself and against others. It would be best to wait for one’s
neighbor’s madness to subside before entering his or her house.
118

of the truths of our own narratives and bring them forward so that we can embrace
them fully and even compare them with other ontologies. Making narratives like
For the Sake of Heaven available in educational communities might open up the
possibility that people might come to their own ontological positions without fear,
considering in the narrative of an 18th century Jewish sect the possibilities of their
own ontological standing.
Your House or Mine
The houses in which we live can become prisons for us, unless we open them
up to others. Opening our houses up will involve relating to others dialogically.
“Come on over. Soup’s on and I’ve got so much to share with you! ” In the process of
planned meetings like this, other things can happen which are not planned. A
telephone call interrupts the conversation, sending you and your friend on a mission
for which you weren’t prepared. But along the way you meet an individual who
changes the course of your life. Just in a moment when you least expect it, an
answer to a deep question comes to you and you feel forever changed. It is in
meetings like these, at first intentional but morphing into times in which all control
seems to have gone out the window, that we begin to understand what it can mean
to relate to others dialogically. To open ourselves up to others in real attentiveness
is the possibility of which I am speaking. The issue for our educational communities
is “How can we plan for this kind of event? Like the idea of planning for the
unintentional, explored above, the idea of planning for real attentiveness seems
somewhat paradoxical. How is it that a planned meeting begins to lose the
character of being planned? I am pointing to Buberian dialogical relationality.
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Entering into dialogical relations may seem something that should not concern
people in educational communities since they apparently do not involve
intentionality. How could one even plan for dialogical relations? The deeper
question may be: Why should people prepare for dialogical relations?
The houses in which we live are the ontologies we embrace. Moreover, the
meetings we have from house to house represent our epistemologies. How we
share those ontologies has to do with our epistemological assumptions. The
concern in epistemology relates to how we acquire knowledge about things. What
gets to be counted as knowledge?
The future of educational communities I am imagining involves true
openness to others. It is in the context of openness alone that certain kinds of
knowledge can arise. While I am calling here for a renewed emphasis on the
creation of spaces in which dialogical relations can manifest, I am not suggesting
that every kind of knowledge transmission should be limited to the dialogical. But I
am suggesting that advocating for objective knowledge to the exclusion of
knowledge derived in contexts of relationships is, as Buber put it, “diabolical”.

Remarks of a Passerby
As I have been writing the dissertation, I have noticed there are things that
might have been done, somewhat tangential to this project, but nevertheless
interesting. I would now like to point to these as possible directions that future
research might take. I think of the ferryman in the Herman Hesse novel, Siddhartha,
who at the end of a life as a gifted Brahmin and a pursuer of wealth and hedonism,
finds himself working at a simple task at life’s end, ushering people through the
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terrors of a river.237 I do not pretend to have the answers to every question that
may interest the reader, nor even to be able to imagine what all the questions
should be, but with Buber I can say that I am interested in pointing to a way to find
them. I would like to consider four possible directions of future research in this
area. First I would like to consider research which concerns the historicity of
historical novel writing. Second, I would like to point to the kind of research that is
interested in the investigation and codification of ontological narratives. Third, I
would like to suggest research which codifies educational curricula. And finally, I
offer the idea that new curricula should be written for educational communities
which situates itself ontologically and epistemologically.
Research in Historicity
As I considered possible criticism of Buber’s novel, I was drawn to the
question of the historicity of his text. This opened up questions about the ways that
history is in itself a kind of narrativizing. Questions about the ways that our own
narratives (ontological assumptions) are always implicated in the ways that we tell
history began to surface. A fascinating way that Buber’s novel could be approached
in the future would involve the investigation of these kinds of questions more
thoroughly. From a historian’s perspective, this type of investigation should prove
to be quite thrilling. The reader of such research could be made to feel more at
home in the novel as well. The effect of this might be to make Buber’s rich narrative
take on a greater significance in our educational communities.
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Research in Ontological Narrative
A fascinating direction that research could take would consider the forms
that ontologies take. That is, future research might involve the collection and
codification of ontologies discovered in novels like For the Sake of Heaven as well as
in other kinds of collections, including narratives found in interviews, collections of
sayings, oral histories and in other types of literature and in other genres. The
stories of Native Americans, of gypsies, of Hasidic communities, of early Christians,
of Temple period Jews, of Reform Judaism, of Chinese Buddhists and Japanese
Shintos and of a host of other communities could be collected. Categories might be
imagined and ontologies compared and contrasted. This would be an invaluable
tool as educational communities seek to develop their own ontological position
narratives.
Research in Educational Curricula
In light of the discussions in this dissertation regarding stated curricula, I
think future research might take the form of investigations into the nature of
curricula. Published curricula could be analyzed and compared across particular
domains, with an eye towards ferreting out any indicators of invisible ontological
grounding. That is, research might seek to establish the dominant ontologies
informing particular curricula, bringing them to the light of day. Results from
research I suggested in ontological narratives could inform this third type of
research. As knowledge is developed regarding ontologies across multiple
communities and comparisons are made, such knowledge could be used as a
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template to determine the origins of curriculum content. And these results might
inform the development of new, accountable curricula which honestly builds upon
stated ontology. No more would curricula appear to be situated as appearing out of
thin air, without logical, ontological antecedents. No more would curriculum be
forced on communities in which the members consider the ontological foundations
of said curricula unworthy of attention, antithetical to the communities’ own
narratives. Why should anyone be forced to do or speak the things that are situated
in ontological contexts that are foreign and inimical to the life of one’s community?
Making ontologies visible would mean that people who live in educational
communities and who cross borders into other educational communities would be
on an equal playing field, able to critique and live out the ontologies of choosing.
Hiding ontological positioning would just be another way to assert hegemonic
dominance, all the while keeping from the members of an educational community
the right to critique the ontological foundations of dominance.
Research in New Curricula
The final suggestion I make is that new models should be developed for new
curricula. What I have in mind here is that published curricula designed for
educational communities ought to be informed by the logic of particular community
ontology. Curricula should begin with ontological positioning. This would validate
the curriculum as contextually relevant, responsive to the narratives that are
assumed in particular communities. This would mean that curricula would be as
varied as are ontological narratives. Curricula would be developed for every kind of
narrative. This would not represent a watering down of curricula across the board
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at local, regional or national levels. It would signal a burgeoning of the life of
curriculum. Imagination in relation to curriculum would soar. Curricula for Native
Americans and others would be developed that pays attention to the group’s
narratives. There would be such an honoring of ontological foundations in this kind
of research. The significant players in particular communities, including parents,
siblings, religious leaders, counselors, scientists, workers, students and others
would see this kind of curriculum research as monumentally significant and worthy.

Surprises
We need to have a relational focus in our educational communities. This
means that we will need to focus on ontological and epistemological positioning.
But in all of this, there is a theme that runs through the work involved in imagining
new kinds of educational communities. This is the element of surprise. Educational
communities need to be situated for surprise with focus on the unplanned and
unintended. This is a departure from common practice, for nothing could be less
like the educational communities we usually imagine than the element of surprise.
We are in general frightened by surprising things in educational communities. We
want to be in control, especially in light of the attention that is given to outcomes
based education approaches. We tend to focus on effectiveness which forestalls any
development of curricula which involves unintended surprises. Normally, we
relegate surprise to aspects we identify as hidden curriculum, at best a kind of lip
service to the idea of focus on the unintentional.
What if we were to let go of the need to control in our educational
communities? What if students were given no stated curriculum and allowed to
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explore things at their own pace and in their own ways in contexts which are
supported by ontological grounding?238 I am not speaking of attempts at developing
ontologically neutral educational communities. I would see in such a monstrous
undertaking a fantastic pretense.239 In such contexts it would be impossible for
students to find any sure footing that would propel them forward. Every action
does have an equal and opposite reaction. A movement forward for a person means
that the force of the ground pushing the person up and forward must be at least as
great as the force of the person’s foot pushing against the ground or else all that will
come of attempts to move forward will be a most certain sinking feeling. Ontological
grounding provides that equal and opposite force which makes it possible for
students to move forward in an educational community. Students could latch onto
community narratives and find in them some direction and a force which belongs to
the student’s having to do with his or her own community’s ontology. This force and
direction is a vector, precisely what stated curricula lack, in their typical forms at
present. No wonder the idea of a focus on the unintentional and surprising is so
frightening in our current educational communities, in general. What would
students do if they did not have experts around to tell them what to do? This is the
kind of concern of an educational community which has no ontological grounding. It
does not know its own narrative. In contexts in which ontology has been identified
and embraced, such a focus is welcome. And this is why students in such
communities might wake up on school mornings actually wanting to go to school. It
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Situating educational communities ontologically appropriately is a recommendation across all age
groups. Every member of an educational community so situated would benefit.
239 The monstrous undertaking of which I speak is the most current form of curriculum development,
as I see it. Curriculum is not built on relevant ontological footing, in general.
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is why teachers might see their own work as a thrilling opportunity to see just what
might happen when people get together and really pay attention to the narratives
that each brings, situated in ontological relevance. The results promise to be
nothing short of surprising.

Conclusion
I began this chapter of the dissertation by retracing the steps I have taken in
the dissertation. I spoke of a particular experience I had as I was writing, that I
found myself becoming willing to be surprised, losing control of the process of
writing in a sense. I found in the process a love of the work that I was exploring.
As I looked back over the work, I pointed to the embrace of the unintentional
as one possible result. I pointed to the clarification of ontological grounding in
educational communities as a kind of taking up residence in a home. Then I
compared the development of dialogical epistemological grounding as a way that
educational communities or that individual members of educational communities
might share their own ontological perspectives or might influence one another
positively. I observed that ontological criticism could be successful only from
another ontological perspective, not from objectivist analysis.
Considering what direction future research might take, I reiterated particular
themes I intended to revisit in the context of recommendations. Among these was
the recommendation for research in the historicity of historical novels. I also
pointed to the possibility of research in ontologies in which particular ontological
positions might be compared across relevant categories. A third direction I
imagined research might take was in educational curricula, with an eye towards
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examining hidden ontological grounding. I then recommended that new curricula
be developed that pays attention to particular ontologies.
Finally in the chapter, I returned to two themes I found to be among the three
most powerful discovered in the novel, For the Sake of Heaven. The first, very
strong idea concerned the focus on the unintentional in the prophet’s community.
The second concerned the theme of surprise and how it could become such an
integral aspect of educational communities the way that we might begin to imagine
them.
The last theme I would like to turn to is the theme Buber developed
concerning turning. To honor Buber’s work, I am willing to be informed by the
Biblical narrative which informed the development of the prophet’s Hasidic
community in the novel, For the Sake of Heaven. To that end, I end the dissertation
with a Psalm and its dialogical interpretation.
Psalm 23
There is a psalm that bears in its words some of the ideas I have been trying
to convey in the dissertation. In the first part of the psalm, the writer speaks of the
other using the third person reference, Lord, and the pronoun, he:

The LORD is my shepherd; I shall not want. He maketh me to lie down
in green pastures: he leadeth me beside the still waters. He restoreth
my soul: he leadeth me in the paths of righteousness for his name's
sake.
Suddenly, the psalmist moves from third person to second person pronouns
of address, using Thou.
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Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will
fear no evil: for thou art with me; thy rod and thy staff they comfort
me. Thou preparest a table before me in the presence of mine
enemies: thou anointest my head with oil; my cup runneth over.
Then the Psalmist recapitulates his stance using a third person reference to
goodness and mercy. He is speaking about them.

Surely goodness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my life: and
I will dwell in the house of the LORD for ever.240
Here is the image of someone in flight, pursued by an enemy. And then there
is the image of Bedouin, desert hospitality. The author of the poem speaks of an
other, in the psalm identified as “the Lord.” He or she speaks in third person of the
relation with the other as restoring, recognizing the way the other is issuing a call
into right kinds of relationship (righteousness). And then there is a turning. From
the third person, the psalmist moves to an address in the second person, from He
(or She) to Thou. Out of suffering (the valley of the shadow of death) there is the
awareness of the other. And in that there is a turning. Now it is “Thou.” In this
turning there is the recognition that there is comfort even in the presence of
enemies. In dialogical ways of being and knowing, there is the possibility of comfort
even when things seem bleak. In dialogical relations there is a turning which
awakens one to the awareness of presence. And, it is this kind of awareness of
others that opens up an infinity of possibility to the ones who are turning. The
“anointing” that comes with this signifies a kind of validation.
Dialogical ways of relating qualify the ones who are turning to one another in
word and in deed. They become fully prepared for whatever it is they are called to
240
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128

be or do or to understand. This is the significance of the cup running over. There is
more than enough to meet the demands of the relationship, whatever they might be.
The Psalmist does not bring to the other anything at all, no assumption, no program,
no plan. Still, his or her cup runs over out of the abundance that comes out of the
relationship.
At last, the person who has come to his or her other finds himself or herself
becoming an object of pursuit in the relationship. Now the person who has turned
to the other, pursued by an enemy (objectivist ontology and epistemology) finds
that goodness and mercy is following. This is another shift out of the world of Thou
back to the world of It. Instead of merely imagining a far off notion of goodness and
mercy, the one who has turned to the other has suddenly found himself or herself
the one to whom the other is turning, and it feels as if the one to whom the other is
turning is now being pursued, this time by goodness and mercy.
Even in this objectifying knowledge, fear of objectification evaporates. The
one finds that in the presence of the other, in the house of the Lord for the Psalmist,
there is a dwelling place (an ontological dwelling). Even in the times that movement
is out of the dialogical and back into the objective, there is no fear in it. The objective
is swallowed up in the relational. In Buber’s terms, dialectic has become dialogic.
I believe that the way forward in our communities of education is found in
the basic movement of turning to others even in contexts in which things and people
are treated objectively. The worries that plague our communities as we objectify
things and people might be made to seem to evaporate as we transition in the cycle
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of turning to others in dialogical relation in contexts that are ontologically situated,
shifting back into objectifying stances and back again into the dialogical.
Even the frightening aspect of what pursues us and what we make objects of
our own pursuits can take on a new character in ontologically situated contexts that
admit dialogical relations. Even objectification can seem to be good and merciful in
this kind of dialogical context. This is the way forward: turning.
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